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Corporate Voluntarism and Liability for
Human Rights in a Post-Kiobel World
Robert C. Bird,' Dani eiR. Caboy,' and LucienJ Dbooge
INTRODUCTION
IN the United States, human rights and the operations of transnational
corporations intersect through litigation filed pursuant to the "Alien Tort
Statute" (ATS). The ATS states that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Largely dormant since
its passage in 1789, the ATS proved contentious since its reinvigoration forty
years ago as a tool by which alien plaintiffs sought to hold foreign government
officials liable in the United States for human rights violations.s Its more recent
utilization against transnational corporations for alleged complicity in human
rights abuses associated with their foreign investment activities proved even
more controversial.'
1 Associate Professor and Northeast Utilities Chair in Business Ethics, School of Business,
University of Connecticut. The authors thank members of the Academy of Legal Studies in Busi-
ness, the University of Connecticut Human Rights Institute and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at the University of Lund, Sweden for their insights in the
preparation of this Article. Financial support from the University of Connecticut School of Busi-
ness summer grant program is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Professor of Business Law and Dean's Faculty Fellow in Business Law, Smeal College of
Business, Pennsylvania State University.
3 Sue and John Staton Professor of Law, Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of
Technology.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (202).
5 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F3 d 844, 846-47 (ith Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d
232,238 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472-73 (9 th Cir. 1994); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-80 (2d
Cir. 5980); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F Supp. 162, 79 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1535 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
6 ATS litigation involving transnational corporations consisted of three distinct types of
claims. These claims alleged violations of human rights relating to personal welfare, labor rights,
and complicity in environmental degradation. For examples of ATS litigation alleging violations
of human rights relating to personal welfare, see, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F 3 d iI,
14-15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (claiming extrajudicial killing and torture arising from the utilization of
the Indonesian military to provide security for a natural gas facility in Aceh); Bowoto v. Chevron
Corp., 621 F 3d m6, ni20-21 (9 th Cir. 200) (claiming collaboration with the Nigerian govern-
ment in the commission of extrajudicial killing, crimes against humanity, torture, cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment and violations of the rights to life, liberty, and security during attacks
upon villages in the Ogoni region); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F 3d 1070,1073, 1075(9 th Cir. 2010) (claiming forced disappearance and torture arising from alleged complicity in the
Central Intelligence Agency's extraordinary rendition program); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
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The issue of whether transnational corporations could be defendants in
human rights litigation to the same degree as government officials and private
individuals remained unresolved after the United States Supreme Court's
first substantive opinion regarding the ATS in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain in
2004.1 After failing to gather the necessary quorum to consider the petition
for certiorari in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Inc., the prospects for
clarification of the ATS in regard to corporations seemed remote.'
However, a new line of cases originating in three different federal circuits
reinvigorated the debate regarding the proper limits of the ATS.' The most
important of these cases came from the Second Circuit in Kiobelv. RoyalDutch
Petroleum Company. 0 In Kiobel, a divided panel held that the ATS does not
grant jurisdiction for lawsuits against corporations." While choosing not to
address this argument, the Supreme Court held that the presumption against
Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 E3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009) (claiming current and former non-Muslim
residents of southern Sudan collaborated with the Sudanese government in the commission of
extrajudicial killings, forcible displacement, war crimes, confiscation, and destruction of property,
kidnapping and rape); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2009) (claiming children
suffered injuries as a result of negligence in the testing of the antibiotic Trovaflozacin Mesylate in
Kano, Nigeria); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 3 d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) (claiming
corporate complicity in supporting the policy of apartheid in South Africa). For examples of ATS
litigation alleging violations of labor rights, see, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643
E3 d ioi3, iox5 (7 th Cir. 20z1) (claiming the use of child labor in the operation of a rubber plantation
in Liberia); Baloco v. Drummond Co., 64o F 3 d 1338, 1341 (nth Cir. 2011) (claiming extrajudicial
killing by paramilitaries at a coal mine in Colombia as a result of the murder of union officials);
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F 3 d 1283, 1286 (sith Cir. 2oo9) (claiming torture
arising from the abduction of union officials by paramilitaries at a banana plantation in Morales,
Guatemala); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3 d 1252, 1257 (sith Cir. 2009) (claiming war crimes
and extrajudicial killing as a result of the murder of a union official by paramilitaries at a bot-
tling facility in Carepa, Colombia); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F 3 d r303,1309 (ith Cir. zoo8)
(claiming extrajudicial killing, torture, and denial of the right to associate in connection with the
murder of union officials by paramilitaries at a coal mine in Colombia); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748
F. Supp. 2d 1057, 5062, ro64 (C.D. Cal. zoo) (claiming the utilization of forced labor, child labor,
and torture in the cultivation of cocoa fields located in Cote d'Ivoire). For examples of ATS litiga-
tion alleging complicity in environmental degradation, see, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F3 d
736, 742, 743 (9 th Cir. 2011) (claiming war crimes, genocide, racial discrimination, violations of the
rights to life, health, and sustainable development and environmental degradation arising from the
operation of a gold and copper mine on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea); Arias v.
Dyncorp, 738 E Supp. 2d 46,48-49 (D.C. 2010) (claiming physical harm and property damage to
Ecuadorian citizens arising from Dyncorp's contract with the U.S. government to eradicate cocaine
and heroin production facilities in Colombia through aerial spraying of pesticides); Flores v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 414 F 3d 233, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2003) (claiming violations of the rights to life, health,
and sustainable development arising from the operation of a copper mine and refinery in Ilo, Peru).
7 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
8 See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. io28, 1o28 (2008) (indicating denial of peti-
tion for certiorari).
9 See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
lo Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 E3 d III (2d Cir. 200).
ii Id at r49.
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the extraterritorial application of U.S. law was applicable to the ATS, thereby
prohibiting its use unless the claims at issue touched and concerned the United
States with sufficient force." Kiobelstruck a blow to human rights jurisprudence,
disabling one of the few viable remaining vehicles in the world for victims of
human rights to seek redress through a national court.
As the U.S. legal door substantially closed on corporate liability, new
non-compulsory opportunities emerged that may facilitate worldwide
protection of human rights. One such promising opportunity is the "Protect,
Respect, and Remedy" framework by Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary General (SRSG) John Ruggie.' 3 This framework advocates three
pillars upon which business respect for human rights should be based: (1) the
state duty to protect human rights through appropriate policies and structures,
(2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights by acting with due
diligence, and (3) greater access to effective judicial and non-judicial remedies
for victims of human rights violations.14 These principles, though backed by the
United Nations and developed with consultation of a variety of corporate and
activist interest groups, are not compulsory." Yet such 'principled pragmatism'
may be all that remains after the already narrowly-interpreted ATS is further
neutered as an effective enforcement tool.
This Article is organized in four parts. Part I explores the development
and the construction of the ATS. This Part shows that, while the ATS
initially offered strong promise as a legal remedy, Supreme Court and lower
court decisions have eroded its potential scope. Part I focuses more closely on
Kiobel in order to understand the potential viability, if any, of ATS claims in a
post-Kiobelworld.
Part II shifts away from legal remedies and focuses on a series of reports
written by the SRSG that develop voluntary and cooperative mechanisms for
business and government to safeguard human rights. This Part introduces the
Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework and the notion of due diligence as a
human rights obligation for multinational corporations. Part III notes that,while
the framework has much merit, it is still in need of substantial reform. 'This Part
also focuses on how ambiguities can be resolved, particularly on the question
of what constitutes sufficient due diligence to protect human rights under the
framework. The goal of this Part is to augment the viability of the SRGS's
framework for future revision, and position it as a well-accepted standard of
12 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659,1669 (2013).
13 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat'l Corps. and Other Bus. Enter.,
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect,
and Remedy' Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/i 7/3 i (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) available at
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.I7. 3 i.pdf [hereinafter SRSG Final Rep.
2011].
14 Id. at Annex III.
15 Id. at I i.
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conduct for businesses to ensure respect for human rights, particularly in light
of the impending dilution of the ATS.
Part IV returns to a legal perspective. This Part briefly outlines a future
potential cause of action that could create a remedy for human rights violations
post-Kiobel. In short, when a corporation's actions differ from its public
promises about respect for human rights, there may be a cause of action based
on the falsehood. While far from a complete substitute for the ATS, this cause
of action, based roughly on advertising liability prohibited by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), may take companies to task that make domestic public
statements directly contradicting their disrespect for human rights abroad. The
Article concludes that regardless of the method, the need to protect human
rights from corporate abuses remains as important as ever, and its placement
in a more prominent position on the corporate agenda represents a worthwhile
goal for all affected and interested parties.
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. Historical Background
Although a comprehensive history of the ATS is beyond the scope of
this Article, a review of its historical background is necessary to place recent
judicial decisions in proper perspective. Interpretation of the ATS has been
complicated by the absence of legislative history. The ATS was not mentioned
in the debates surrounding the adoption of the first Judiciary Act in 1789, and
there is no evidence of what its drafters intended by its inclusion.'6 'Ihis lack of
formal legislative history was a significant source of frustration for courts called
upon to interpret its provisions in a contemporary context.'7
An established body of judicial precedent is also unavailable for modern
interpretations. The ATS was an infrequent subject of judicial opinions
prior to the 1980s." In addition to these judicial opinions, the ATS was the
16 See, e.g.,Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J., con-
curring) (noting "[tlhe debates over the Judiciary Act in the House-the Senate debates were not
recorded-nowhere mention the provision, not even, so far as we are aware, indirectly").
17 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F 3d 88, 104 n.ao (2d Cir. 2000) (noting
"[tihe original purpose of the [ATS] remains the subject of some controversy .... [as] [t]he Act has
no formal legislative history" and the intent of the drafters was "a matter forever hidden from our
view by the scarcity of relevant evidence"); Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Human Rights Litigation), 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting "[tlhe debates that led to the
Act's passage contain no reference to the [ATS], and there is no direct evidence of what the First
Congress intended it to accomplish"); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 2d 289,304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting "[d]espite the fact that the [ATS] has existed for over
two hundred years, little is known of the framers'intentions in adopting it-the legislative history
of the Judiciary Act does not refer to section 1350").
18 See, e.g., O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908) (suggesting that the ATS may
be applicable to a claim that a U.S. officer illegally seized alien property in a foreign state); Nguyen
Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1R94, 12O-02 n.i3 (9 th Cir. 1975) (observing that injuries accruing as
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subject matter of two opinions of the U.S. Attorney General dating from
1795 and 1907.19 Other sources of interpretation were absent prior to the
watershed opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala20 and Kadic v. Karadz Ic.2
The Supreme Court finally addressed the ATS in substantive detail in 2004
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.2 2 In an opinion authored by Justice Souter, the
Court concluded the ATS was a jurisdictional statute intended to address the
power of federal courts to "entertain cases concerned with a certain topic." 23
This interpretation did not lead to the conclusion that the ATS was inoperative
until such time as Congress created a list of actionable torts.2 4 Instead, the Court
endorsed the conclusion that federal courts were entitled to entertain claims for
torts in violation of the law of nations as recognized by common law existing
at the time of the adoption of the ATS.25 These torts were limited to violations
of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.26 These
torts were within the "relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the
law of nations" over which the ATS conferred jurisdiction.2 1
However, the Court found no congressional developments in the
intervening years to preclude courts from recognizing new claims under the
the result of the evacuation of children from Vietnam by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service and private adoption agencies could be addressed pursuant to the ATS); Abdul-Rahman
Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-64 (D. Md. 1961) (concluding wrongful withholding of
custody of a child was an actionable tort and the misuse of a passport to gain entry into the United
States was a violation of international law); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 E Cas. 8io, Bro (C.C.D.S.C. 1795)
(No. 1607) (concluding the ATS granted jurisdiction with respect to a dispute concerning title to
slaves seized on a captured enemy vessel).
i9 See Mexican Boundary - Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. Atty Gen. 250, 252 (1907)
(concluding the ATS "provide[s] a forum and a right of action" to Mexican nationals injured as
a result of the diversion of the Rio Grande by a U.S. irrigation company if such act was deemed
to be a tort in violation of the law of nations); Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,59 (1795)
(concluding the ATS provided a remedy for aliens injured as a result of the participation of U.S.
citizens in the plundering of British property off the coast of Sierra Leone by French naval forces
in violation of principles of neutrality).
20 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 Ezd 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding torture perpetrated by a
Paraguayan police official upon a private citizen of Paraguay violated the law of nations and was
actionable by the victim's survivors pursuant to the ATS).
21 Kadic v. Karadz I, 70 E3 d 232, 236, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding genocide, war crimes, tor-
ture, and extrajudicial killing perpetrated by a private individual against other private individuals
violated the law of nations, were actionable pursuant to the ATS and did not present nonjusticiable
issues).
22 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
23 Id. at 714.
24 Early federal cases and opinions addressing the ATS gave no intimation that furthier im-
plementing legislation was necessary. See, e.g., Bolchos v. Darrel,3 E Cas. 8io, 81o (C.C.D.S.C. 1795)
(No. 1607); Breach of Neutrality, x Op. Att'y Gen. at 59-
25 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
26 Id. at 715.
27 Id. at 7 20.
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law of nations.2 8 Justice Souter concluded "judicial power should be exercised
on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping,
and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today."29 New claims
based on international norms were not recognizable if they had "less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when [the ATS] was enacted." 0 The Court cited piracy and torture as
two of "a handful of heinous actions" meeting this standard and thus actionable
pursuant to the ATS.3' Plaintiff Alvarez's claim of arbitrary arrest failed to meet
this stringent standard and was subject to dismissal.32
Sosa left unresolved the question of private liability for violations of
international law. Justice Souter's opinion expressly reserved the issue of
"whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a
given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a corporation or individual."" Justice Souter did not elaborate upon this
question other than to contrast the results in Tel-Oren and Kadic with respect
to private liability for torture and genocide committed by private actors.3 4
B. Corporate Liability Under the ATS
Despite the absence of resolution in Sosa, it was widely assumed that
international law in general, and international human rights law in particular,
applied to transnational corporations.35 This assumption led to the conclusion
28 Id. at 724--25.
29 Id. at 729.
30 Id. at 732.
31 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, is U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 63-8o (1820) (defining piracy);
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Ara Repbulic, 726 E2d 774,781 (C.A.D.C. 1984) (equating the severity of tor-
ture with that of piracy).
32 Id. at 734-35. The Court dismissed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a basis
for Alvarez's claim as it was a statement of aspirations only and did not impose binding obligations
upon national governments. Id. The Court rejected utilization of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights as it was ratified by the United States on the express understanding that
it was not self-executing. Id. at 735. In addition, Alvarez's claim lacked the necessary "state policy"
and "prolonged" nature to qualify as an enforceable norm. Id. at 737 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
oF FOREIGN REIATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs § 702 (1986)). Although the exact mean-
ing of these terms remained an open question, the Court held that they clearly required "a factual
basis beyond relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority."Id Even assuming Alvarezs
detention was "prolonged" and the result of "state policy," it remained impossible to determine if
and when such detention achieved the degree of certainty necessary to violate international law
characteristic of the offenses of piracy, interference with ambassadors and violation of safe conduct.
Id. The Court concluded the principle advanced by Alvarez remained, "in the present, imperfect
world . .. an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity [the Court]
requires."Id. at 738.
33 Id. at 732 n.2o.
34 Id
35 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, No. 02-56256, zonr U.S. App. LEXIS 2155, at *744 (9 th Cir. Oct.
25, 20) (holding that the plaintiffs'claims of genocide and war crimes arising from the operation
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that transnational corporations possess duties with respect to human rights,
the violation of which may be subject to the initiation of litigation pursuant to
the ATS. 6 Numerous commentators shared this assumption.17 However, this
assumption was questioned in a series of opinions dating from 2010." The most
of a gold and copper mine on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea were within the
limited federal jurisdiction created by the ATS and that no principle of international or domestic
law served to impose liability for violations of international norms on individuals while immuniz-
ing corporations); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Co., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (in which the court
stated "[t]he issue of corporate liability has remained in the background during the thirty years
since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga, while numerous courts have considered cases against
corporations ... under the ATS without any indication that the issue was in controversy"); Baloco v.
Drummond Co., 640 F 3 d 1338,1345 (nith Cir. 20ui) (holding that children of murdered union lead-
ers in Colombia had adequately pled a cause of action cognizable under the ATS without reference
to whether the defendant was a state or private actor); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc.,416
E3 d 1242, 1256 (ith Cir. 2005) (holding that corporations may be liable for human rights violations
without specifically addressing the applicability of the ATS); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
197 F 3d 161, 163 (Sth Cir. 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs'claims alleging complicity in environmental
degradation without specifically addressing the applicability of the ATS to corporations); Roe v.
Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp.2d 988, 1010-24 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that corporations may
be liable for human rights violations without specifically addressing the applicability of the ATS).
36 See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F3 d 1303, 1315 (iuth Cir. 2008) (expressly rejecting
the argument that corporations are not subject to the ATS as there is no "express exception for
corporations" nor was such an exception recognized within the circuit); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort
Litigation, 665 F Supp.2d 569,588 (E.D. Va. 2009) (concluding that "[nJothing in the ATS or Sosa
may plausibly be read to distinguish between private individuals and corporations").
37 See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, Note, Rebuttak The Supreme Court Should Overturn Kio-
bel, 16o U. PA. L. REv. PENNuMBRA 99, io6 (2011), available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/
debates/index.php?id=44 (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (contending that the question of whether cor-
porations may be civilly accountable for violations of international law in domestic courts is for
individual states to determine within their national legal systems); Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory
of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, io9
COLUM. L. REv. 1094, 1224 (2009) (indicating an instance where a corporation was not exempt-
ed from liability for violations of international law at Nuremberg given the presence of counsel
throughout the proceedings and the argument given at the close of the proceedings); Susan Farb-
stein & Tyler Giannini, Note, Closing Statement: Kiobel Ignores History in Creating a Corporate
Carve-Out, 16o U.PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 99, 110 (20H), available athttp://www.pennlawreview.
com/debates/index.php?id=44 (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (citing opinions spanning thirteen years
of ATS jurisprudence in which parties or courts assumed or specifically held that the ATS was
applicable to corporations); Geoffrey Pariza, Genocide, Inc.: Corporate Immunity to Violations ofln-
ternationalLaw After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 8 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 229, 250 (2011)
(contending post-war practicalities rather than a desire to immunize corporations from liability for
violations of international law led to the determination not to prosecute corporations at Nurem-
berg); Janine M. Stanisz, The Expansion of Limited Liability Protection in the Corporate Form: The
Aftermath ofKiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,5 BROOK.J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 573 , 593 (2on,)
(noting the Nuremburg Tribunal's discussion of corporate obligations and responsibilities pursuant
to international law even in the absence of a named corporate defendant); Mara Theophilia, "Moral
Monsters" Under the Bed: Holding CorporationsAccountablefor Violations oftheAlien Tort Statute After
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2907 (2oon) (contending that the
"specific, universal and obligatory norm" required by Sosa applied to the conduct at issue rather than
the identity of the perpetrator).
38 See, e.g., Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1o57, 1143-45 (C.D. Cal. 200) (rejecting claims that
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important of these opinions, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., is discussed
below.
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.-The most significant and
comprehensive opinion rejecting the use of the ATS against transnational
corporations was the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co." The plaintiffs in Kiobel were residents of Nigeria who claimed
that Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian
government in human rights violations during the course of oil exploration
and production operations in the Ogoni region.40 The district court dismissed
the plaintiffs' claims with the exception of those relating to arbitrary arrest and
detention, crimes against humanity, and torture.4 1
The Second Circuit dismissed the remaining claims. The court initially
determined that Sosa required the case be determined through the application
of customary international law rather than the domestic law of the United
States or any other country.42 The fact that a particular legal norm, such as
corporate tort liability, may be found in the legal systems of most or even all
"civilized nations" does not give that norm status as customary international
law.43 It is only where nations demonstrate that a wrong is of "mutual, and
not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a
wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the
meaning of the [ATS]."4
Applying such law, the court found no specific, universal, and obligatory
norm holding transnational corporations responsible for human rights
violations. 'This conclusion did not render the ATS ineffective. Rather, it was
available against individual perpetrators such as "employees, managers, officers,
and directors of a corporation--as well as anyone who purposefully aids and
the defendants aided and abetted violations of international norms prohibiting slavery, forced labor,
child labor, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment arising from the operation of
cocoa fields in Cate d'Ivoire on the basis that there was no specific, universal and obligatory norm
supporting the application of international law in general, and human rights law in particular, to
transnational corporations under either domestic law, customary international law or treaties and
conventions); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 81o, 102 4 (S.D. Ind. 201o)
(rejecting claims arising from the alleged use of child labor on rubber plantations operated by the
defendants in Liberia due to the absence of corporate liability pursuant to international criminal
law and the Torture Victim Protection Act and the possibility of disparate treatment by extending
the benefits of the ATS to aliens while denying the availability of ATS remedies to U.S. citizens).
39 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F 3 d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
40 Id. at 117.
41 Id. at n18-19 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 56 F. Supp.2d 457, 465-67
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
42 Id. at u7-r8.The court in particular noted that "[tihe history of corporate rights and obliga-
tions under domestic law is, however, entirely irrelevant to the issue before us-namely, the treat-
ment of corporations as a matter of customary international law." Id. at 117 n.u.
43 Id. at 118.
44 Id. (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 E2d 100, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
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abets [such violations]." 45 Criminal, civil, and administrative remedies against
corporations themselves were available as long as the source of such remedies
was not customary international law.'
Therefore, Sosa mandated the application of customary international law
in such cases. 47 This conclusion was reinforced in Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion in which he stated that "[t]he norm must extend liability to the type
of perpetrator (e.g. a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue." 48 The court noted
that it had applied this standard consistently since Filartiga.49 International
law had guided the court in determining whether the state officials, private
individuals, and aiders and abettors could be held liable under the ATS.s0 Given
this history, there was no reason to consult a different set of rules with respect
to corporate liability.s"
Additional support for this conclusion was found in the history of
international tribunals. No tribunal had ever held a corporation liable for a
violation of international law. The London Charter granted the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg jurisdiction solely over natural persons.52
Although the Nuremberg Tribunals declared certain organizations associated
with the Nazi war effort to be criminal, this was, according to the court, merely
to facilitate prosecution of the individual members." Thus, although I.G.
Farben and its affiliated entities were dissolved as a result of their involvement
with the operation of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz, only their executives
were charged, indicted, or prosecuted.54 As noted in the Nuremberg judgment
45 Id. at IZ-22.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 127 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
48 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 760 (2004) (BreyerJ., concurring).
49 Kiobel, 621 E 3d at 132.
5o See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F 3 d 244, 258-59 (2d Cir.
2009) (determining the status of aiders and abettors); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F 3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cit.
1995) (determining the status of private individuals); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889-90
(2d Cir. 1980) (determining the status of state officials).
51 Kiobel, 621 F.3 d at 130.
52 Id at 133-34. (noting that the London Charter grants authority to "try and punish persons
... whether as individuals or as members of organizations" (citing Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279)). The same limitation was included in the tribunal established with respect
to the war in the Pacific theater and in Control Council Law No. io. See id. at 134 (indicating that
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East grants jurisdiction over "war
criminals who as individuals or as members of organizations are charged with offenses" (citing
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5,Jan. 19,1946,4 BEVANS 20, 22
)). See also Control Council Law No. io, Punishment ofPersons Guilty offWar Crimes, Crimes Against
Peace andAgainst Humanity, in I ENACTMENTS AND APPROVED PAPERS OF THE CONTROL COUN-
CIL AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE 306, 309 (1945) (granting jurisdiction to the International
Military Tribunal).
53 Kiobel, 621 F 3d at 134.
54 Id. at135.
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itself, "[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced."ss
International tribunals since Nuremberg also excluded corporations. For
example, the charters establishing the criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia both excluded corporations from liability.s6 According to
the court, these charters codified existing norms of customary international
law limiting liability to natural persons." The more recent failure of the states
negotiating the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to include
corporations within the court's jurisdiction after lengthy consideration was
equally important.ss History suggests that corporate liability was a concept that
had yet to ripen into a universally accepted norm of international law."
The court also concluded international treaties did not support the existence
of a specific, universal, and obligatory norm by which to hold transnational
corporations liable for human rights violations. Treaties only constituted
sufficient proof of a norm of customary international law if an "overwhelming
majority" of states had ratified and conducted themselves according to their
termsY' The United States and an overwhelming majority of members of the
international community had not ratified treaties that imposed corporate
liability in other areas, such as environmental protection, and labor rights.6'
55 The Nurnberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, no (Int'l Military Trib. at
Nuremberg t946).
56 See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 5, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/ 9 55 (Nov. 8, 1994) (restricting jurisdiction to "natural persons"). See also U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 8o8, 52, U.N. Doc. S/z 57 o4 (May
3, 1993) (restricting jurisdiction to "natural persons").
57 Kiobel, 621 E3d at 136 (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F-3d 254, 274 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring)). The issue of corporate liability was expressly addressed and
rejected with respect to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. See Report
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 ofSecurity Council Resolution 808, supra note 56, 1 50 (stating that "the ordi-
nary meaning of the term 'persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law'would be natural persons to the exclusion of juridical persons").
58 See Kiobel, 621 E3 d at 136-37. A proposal to include corporate liability for human rights
violations within the Rome Statute was withdrawn after encountering opposition from twenty-
five states, including Australia, China, Mexico, South Korea, and the United States. See Doe v.
Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1o57,1140 (C.D. Cal. 20o0) (discussing the negotiating history of the Rome
Statute). As a result, the Rome Statute is solely applicable to "natural persons."The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(I), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.TS. 90, 105. For a complete
discussion of the consideration and ultimate exclusion of corporations from the jurisdictional reach
of the International Criminal Court, see Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in I THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767,778 (Antonio
Cassese et al., eds., 2002).
59 Kiobel, 621 E3d at 137.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Explora-
tion and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, Dec. 17, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 1450 (not ratified by
the United States); Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of
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These treaties also did not support the existence of a broad norm imposing
liability for human rights violations upon corporations." In fact, these treaties
could not even be viewed as crystallizing an emerging norm with respect to
corporate liability or described as having a "norm-creating" character.6 1
Finally, the court rejected the existence of a norm imposing corporate
liability on three additional grounds. First, the court rejected the imposition of
liability on "policy and reason"grounds because Sosa requires specific, universal,
and obligatory norms rather than "abstract aspirations or even pragmatic
concerns in place of specific international rules."" Second, despite trends to the
contrary, the prevailing view among scholars is that international law primarily
regulates states and not individuals and corporations.6 s The court concluded
by distinguishing the attorney general's opinions in 1795 and 1907, which
purportedly extended the ATS to corporate activities.66
C. Once More Into the Breach:
7he US. Supreme Court and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
The one topic on which courts and commentators could agree was the need
for further guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. Such guidance appeared
forthcoming in October 2011 when the Court granted certiorari to review
the Second Circuit's holding regarding the application of human rights
Nuclear Material, Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.TS. 255 (not ratified by the United States, China, Russia,
or the United Kingdom); Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21,
1963, 1063 U.N.TS. 265 (not ratified by the United States, China, France, Germany, or the United
Kingdom); Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956
U.N.TS. 263 (not ratified by the United States, China, Russia, or Germany); Convention (No. 98)
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively,
July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.TS. 257 (not ratified by the United States).
62 Kiobel, 621 F 3d at 138.
63 Id. at 139.
64 Id. at 140 & n.41. The court described "policy and reason" grounds as including the "logical
expansion of existing norms," the absence of a policy reason for a corporate exemption from liabil-
ity, the recognition of corporate liability under federal common law, and the imposition of duties
upon corporations given that they are persons and rights-carrying entities. Id. For firther discus-
sion of "parity of reasoning,"see Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Mythfrom RealityAbout Corporate
Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 263, 265 (2004).
65 See, e.g., MICHAEL KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STAT-
UTE: ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH US TORTS LAW 196 (2009) (concluding
that, "despite trends to the contrary, the view that international law primarily regulates States and
in limited instances such as international criminal law, individuals, but not [transnational corpora-
tions], is still the prevailing one among international law scholars").
66 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142 n.44 (dismissing these opinions as doing nothing more than "baldly
declar[ing] that a corporation can sue under the ATS ... or that a corporation can be sued under
the ATS ... [without describing] any basis for assumptions about customary international law").
The 1907 opinion was inconsistent with Sosa to the extent it concluded the ATS provided a forum
and cause of action. Id. With respect to the 1795 opinion, it was unclear to the court whether the
discussion regarding the "Sierra Leone Company"was applicable to "modern juridical entities."Id
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norms to corporations in Kiobel.67 The parties presented oral arguments on
February 28, 2012 on the issue of whether international human rights norms
are applicable to corporations as to support the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant
to the ATS. The differing viewpoints of the Justices were on full display in the
course of the arguments. Several Justices expressed doubt about the existence of
a specific, universal, and obligatory international norm providing for corporate
liability for human rights violations." Another concern was the appropriateness
of the United States as a forum for claims made by non-citizens against
other non-citizens arising from conduct that occurred entirely outside of the
United States." Other Justices focused on the narrower question of identifying
appropriate defendants pursuant to the ATS,70 the possible consequences
of blanket immunity for corporations, 7 the meaning of and effect upon the
ATS of the holdings of the Nuremberg Tribunal,7 2 and alternatives to direct
corporate liability such as through respondeat superior.7 1
The concerns regarding the extraterritorial reach of the ATS rose to the
forefront five days after oral arguments when the Court issued an order
restoring the case to the calendar for reargument. 74 The question for reargument
was whether and under what circumstances the ATS allows for U.S. courts to
recognize causes of action for violations of the law of nations occurring outside
of U.S. territory. Oral arguments on this issue occurred on October 1, 2012.7
67 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472,472 (Oct. 17, Zoin) (No. to-I49I) (order
granting petition for writ of certiorari).
68 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Arguments at 3,1. 24 - p. 4, 11. 1-6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (Feb. 28, 2012) (No. io-1491) (Justice Kennedy stating that "[n]o other
nation in the world permits its court to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterrito-
rial human rights abuses to which the nation has no connection" and requesting appellants'counsel
to provide his "best authority to refute that proposition").
69 Id. at 7, 11. 7-9, p. II, 11. 22-24 (Justice Alito noting that there is "no particular connection
between the events here and the United States" which led him to ask "[w]hat business does a case
like that have in the courts of the United States?"). See also id. at 41,11. 22-25 (Justice Kennedy rec-
ognizing the position of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands that "corporations should not
be liable for acts committed on foreign territories").
70 Id. at 13, 11. 14-16 (Justice Ginsburg stating "I thought what we were talking about today,
the question was is it only individual defendants or are corporate defendants also liable?"). See also
id. at 23,11. 11-14 (Justice Breyer stating that "I would have thought the question in this case is, can
a private actor be sued for certain violations of substantive criminal law?").
71 Id. at 25, 11. 16-23 (Justice Breyer asking whether an eighteenth century U.S. court would
have excused piracy if it was conducted by "Pirates, Incorporated" rather than Blackbeard person-
ally).
72 Id. at 35, 11. 19-21 (Justice Ginsburg noting that I.G. Farben was dissolved and its assets
confiscated as a result of the Nuremberg proceedings).
73 Id at 39, 11. 1-7 (Justice Kagan discussing the possibility of corporate liability for human
rights violations committed by individual corporate actors through the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior).
74 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (Mar. 5, 2012) (No. 10-1491) (order
restoring case to calendar for reargument).
75 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1,1. 11, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 33 S. Ct. 1669
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The petitioners' and respondents' arguments with respect to this issue were
relatively predictable. The petitioners (the Nigerian residents and original
plaintiffs) contended that the exercise of universal jurisdiction in civil cases
involving corporate violations of international human rights norms was a
"trend in the world today" in which the United States was a standard bearer
as evidenced by the ATS.76 The respondents (the British, Dutch, and Nigerian
corporations and original defendants) argued that extraterritorial reach of the
ATS in this case was unjustified given that the case had "nothing to do with the
United States ... [i]t's Nigerian plaintiffs suing an English and Dutch company
for activity alleged to have aided and abetted the Nigerian government for
conduct taking place entirely within Nigeria."7n By contrast, the United States
shifted its support from the petitioners in the February 2012 oral arguments to
the respondents in the October 2012 arguments. While disagreeing with the
respondents in the February arguments on whether corporations were immune
from ATS liability," the United States expressed its support for the respondents'
position on the ATS's extraterritorial reach in the October arguments with
respect to claims against corporations for aiding and abetting human rights
violations." The Court remained divided on this issue as well.80
(Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 10-1491).
76 See, e.g., id. at 55,11. z2-I8 (statement of petitioners'counsel Paul L. Hoffman).
77 Id. at 22, 1. 10-14 (quoting respondents' counsel Kathleen M. Sullivan).
78 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, 11. 18-22, p. 22, 11. 21-24, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pe-
troleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1669 (Feb. 28, 2012) (No. 10-149) (Solicitor General stating "[lhe court of
appeals erred in its categorical ruling that a corporation may never be held liable under the Alien
Tort Statute regardless of the norm, the locus of the wrong, or the involvement of the state" and
that "[t]he question of extraterritorial application is distinct from the question of whether a corpo-
ration can be held liable").
79 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, 11. 3-8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 1669 (Oct. 1, 2012) (No. 10-1491) (Solicitor General stating "[t]he Alien Tort Statute should
not afford a cause of action to address the extraterritorial conduct of a foreign corporation when
the allegation is that the defendant aided and abetted a foreign sovereign. In this category of cases,
there just isn't any meaningfisl connection to the United States.").
80 See id. at 4, 11. 9-12 (Justice Kennedy questioning the U.S. origin of effects occurring in
Nigeria). See also id. at 24, 11. 20-22 (in which Justice Scalia restated his strong belief in the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law). But see id. at 13,11.5-9 (Justice Sotomayor
expressing support for a test that permitted ATS jurisdiction in cases where the defendant is a
citizen of the country, the acts occurred within the country, or the alien has exhausted domestic and
international avenues for relief). See also id at 23, 11. 8-17, p. 36, 11. 6-13, p. 38, 11. 21-22, p. 40, 11. 2-13
(Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan characterizing the defendants'argument as inconsistent
with the well-accepted interpretation of the ATS set forth in Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala).
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Given these considerations, it was far from certain that the ATS would
survive the Court's decision in Kiobel. These concerns were confirmed by the
announcement of the Court's opinion on April 17, 2013. In a unanimous
decision, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's dismissal of the petitioners'
complaint." However, the reasons for so doing were fractured into four separate
opinions.
Authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas, the majority dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the
basis of the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law." The
application of this presumption was appropriate in these circumstances given
the absence of explicit congressional intent that the ATS have extraterritorial
reach and the presumption that, while governing domestic affairs, U.S. law
"does not rule the world."" The application of this presumption additionally
served to "protect against unintended clashes between [U.S.] law and those of
other nations which could result in international discord."84
This concern about unnecessary judicial intrusion into foreign affairs
and the resultant potential for discord was particularly acute with respect to
actions brought pursuant to the ATS.The Court specifically noted the repeated
stress upon the exercise of judicial caution and awareness of foreign policy
considerations in its previous ATS opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain." Such
caution and awareness were even more necessary when the purported cause of
action concerned conduct occurring within the territory of a foreign sovereign."
These concerns and considerations led the Court to apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality to the ATS despite the fact that it is a jurisdictional
statute, and the presumption was traditionally reserved for merits questions."
The majority opinion then turned to whether the petitioners effectively
rebutted the presumption by demonstrating a "clear indication of
extraterritoriality."" The majority of the Court concluded that the petitioners
had failed to do so. Initially, the Court found that nothing in the text of
the ATS itself suggested that it was intended to have extraterritorial reach.
Extraterritorial reach could not be implied from the mere fact that the ATS
81 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1664 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437,454 (2007)).
84 Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (x99)).
85 Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,727-28 (2004), in which the Court noted
that "the potential [foreign policy] implications . . . of recognizing . . . causes [under the ATS]
should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Branches in managing foreign affairs" and the need for "great caution" given that "many
attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law
would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences").
86 Id at 1665.
87 Id. at 1664 (citing Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 499 at 246).
88 Id. at 1665 (citing Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., r30 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (zoo)).
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mentioned "aliens" and "the law of nations."" The use of the term "any civil
action" was equally unconvincing as it was well established that generic terms
such as "any" or "every" were insufficient to rebut the presumption. 0 Similarly,
the inclusion of the term "tort" was not effective in rebutting the presumption
as the transitory tort doctrine allowed recovery when a cause of action arose in
the territory of another sovereign only when there was "a well founded belief
that it was a cause of action in that place."9' The issue was thus whether the
ATS granted U.S. courts authority to recognize a cause of action under U.S.
law to enforce norms of international law.92 The answer to this question was in
the negative-the use of the term "tort" did not necessarily mean that Congress
intended for the ATS to reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign
sovereign.93
Extraterritorial application was further unsupported by the ATS' historical
background. Two of the three principal offenses against the law of nations for
which the ATS was intended to provide relief-violation of safe conduct and
infringement of the rights of ambassadors-had no "necessary extraterritorial
application." 4  Instead, both of these offenses were committed against
individuals who were within the boundaries of the sovereign recognizing the
cause of action and allowing for the initiation of civil litigation." The third
offense, piracy, presented a more difficult question; the Court traditionally
regarded the high seas upon which piracy occurs as the equivalent of foreign soil
for purposes of the application of the presumption against extraterritoriality.'
However, the Court concluded that the application of U.S. law to pirates did not
"typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring
within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign" and thus carried "less
direct foreign policy consequences." 7 This conclusion was based upon the
extraordinary international status of pirates who were "fair game wherever
found, by any nation, because they did not operate within any jurisdiction.""
As a "category unto themselves," the application of national laws to this small
group of individuals did not create significant foreign policy concerns.99
89 Id.
go Id. (citing Morrison, 3o S. Ct. at 2881-82; Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (zoos);
Arabian Amer Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248-50; Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 33 6 U.S. 281, 287 (1949)).
91 Id. at 1666 (citing Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473,479 (1912)).
92 Id at 1666.
93 Id
94 Id
95 Id. (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 245-48, 251 (1765) (describing these
offenses as being committed against persons "who are here").
96 Id. at 1667 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 55, 173-74 (1993); Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 44o (1989)).
97 Id. at 1667.
9 8 Id
99 Id. The Court specifically noted that "when a statute provides for some extraterritorial ap-
plication, the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its terms."
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The Attorney-General's opinion of 1795, purporting to advocate the
application of the ATS to events occurring outside of the territory of the United
States, according to the majority defied "a definitive reading."1" The Court
was unwilling to attempt to interpret the opinion or determine its "precise
meaning."' 0' Whatever the opinion's intended meaning, the majority found it
"hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality."102
Finally, the Court concluded there was no evidence that Congress adopted
the ATS in order to make the United States "a uniquely hospitable forum
for the enforcement of international norms."103 To the contrary, the majority
concluded it was implausible that Congress would have intended to embroil
the struggling fledging republic in international controversy by requiring the
extraterritorial application of its laws.1" Such an interpretation would have
generated diplomatic strife.' It also would create difficulties for U.S. citizens
who could be haled into court anywhere in the world for alleged violations of
the law of nations occurring in the United States or abroad. 06 Such serious
foreign policy consequences mandated that any such decisions be relegated
to the political braches rather than the judiciary." As a result, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of the appellants' claims as they did not touch and
concern U.S. territory "with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application." 0
Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437,455-56 (2007)).
loo Id. at 1668. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
101 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. The Court specifically noted that "the parties offer no evidence that any nation, meek
or mighty, presumed to do such a thing."Id.
105 Id. at 1669 (citing Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F 3d 1, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 20) (Kavana-
ugh,J., dissenting) (listing recent objections to the extraterritorial application of the ATS by Cana-
da, Germany, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
1o6 Id.
107 Id.
1o8 Id. The majority firther noted that "mere corporate presence" within U.S. territory did
not constitute sufficient force by which to displace application of the presumption. Id. In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that the majority's opinion left open a number
of "significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation" of the ATS and that the Court
might be required to elaborate on its holding in future cases outside the scope of the opinion. Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not identify these unresolved questions or the type
of cases that may be outside of the majority's opinion.Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion joined
by Justice Thomas, concluded that an ATS claim could only be maintained for conduct occurring
within the United States that violated a norm of international law satisfying Sosa's requirement of
definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations. Id. at 1669-7o (Alito, J., concurring). Justice
Breyer, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor, rejected the
majority's invocation of the presumption against extraterritoriality on the bases that the ATS was
enacted with foreign relations in mind through its use of terms such as "aliens,""treaties" and "the
616 [ Vol. 102
2013- 20141 HUMAN RIGHTS IN A POST-KIOBEL WORLD
II. PRINCIPLED PRAGMATISM AND THE PROTECT, RESPECT,
AND REMEDY FRAMEWORK
The holding in Kiobel significantly diminished viable legal remedies for
liability; therefore, the search continues for ways to encourage multinational
corporations to respect human rights. One possibility is the utilization of
legitimized and voluntary initiatives that establish standards and encourage
change, but without the looming threat ofjudicial action. This Part focuses on
one such promising possibility, the Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework
developed by United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General
John Ruggie.' 09 Among other things, this framework exhorts corporations to
respect human rights and "act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the
rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved.""o
The purpose of this Part is to evaluate the framework, in particular the
due diligence process, and offer recommendations for improvement. The
Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework represents the most viable global
tool that encourages multinational corporations to respect human rights.
The framework has been widely well received by corporations, governments,
and NGOs." Thus, any advancement towards improving the widespread
application of this framework represents an important step toward facilitating
law of nations." Id. at 1670-72 (Breyer, J., concurring). Additionally, the application of the ATS to
piracy necessarily required the application of U.S. law to acts within the jurisdiction of foreign
sovereigns as ships engaged in piracy are within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag they fly.
Id. at 1672. The majority's application of the presumption against extraterritoriality was further
undermined by the rejection of such application by lower courts, the fact that many states permit
foreign nationals to initiate litigation based upon unlawful conduct of their own nationals occurring
abroad, and Congress'authorization of the punishment of foreign perpetrators of serious violations
of international law against foreign persons through legislation as well as the absence of legislation
restricting the jurisdictional reach of the ATS. Id. at x675-77. Justice Breyer proposed an alternative
in which jurisdiction existed under the ATS where (r) the alleged tort occurred on U.S. soil, (2) the
defendant is a U.S. national or (3) the defendant's conduct "substantially and adversely affects and
important American national interest" which includes the prevention of the United States from
serving as a safe harbor free of civil and criminal liability for human rights violators. Id. at 1673-74.
In applying this alternative approach, Justice Breyer concluded these elements were missing in
Kiobelas the defendants were non-U.S. corporations whose sole presence in the United States were
offices of separate but affiliated companies, the plaintiffs were not U.S. nationals, the conduct took
place in Nigeria and the defendants did not directly engage in human rights violations but were
alleged to have assisted other non-U.S. nationals to do so. Id. at 1677-78.
109 For a biography of Dr. John Ruggie, see JOHN RUGGIE, PROFILE, HARVARD KENNEDY
SCHOOL, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/john-ruggie (last visited Jan.
19, 2014).
11o SRSG Final Rep. 2o1, supra note 13, 6; see also infra Part II.A.
III E.g., Chris Jochnick & Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized:A New UN
Framework Meets Texaco in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L. REV. 413, 421 (20I0) (noting
the framework's widespread acceptance); Adrienne Margolis, Multinational Corporations Operate
Seamlessly Across National Borders, But Insufficient Regulations Have Led to Disastrous Consequences
for Human Life, 64 INT'L B. NEWS 23,25 (2010) (accepting the framework's application).
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protection of human rights. Furthermore, with the apparent decline or even
demise of the ATS as a future possibility for protection, enhancement of such a
well-respected framework becomes an even more important and pressing task.
A. The History and Development of the Framework
An understanding of the framework today requires comprehension of the
historical context in which it arose. For decades international organizations
have been developing methods to concretize the obligations of multinational
businesses to human rights. For example, the Code of Conduct forTransnational
Corporations, drafted by the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations
between 1977 and 1990, was motivated by similar concerns expressed by the
U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to the Secretary-General in
1972.112 ECOSOC cited "the emergence of the increasingly integrated global
economy, the prominence of international trade and investment, the growth
of information and communications technology . . . increasing privatization
land] concerns about the impact of globalization and trade on human rights"
as grounds for the renewal of efforts to formulate a code of conduct for
corporations. 13
ECOSOC was also motivated to act as a result of increased stakeholder
concerns about human rights manifested through enhanced consumer
awareness, shareholder initiatives, and the proliferation of non-governmental
organizations and voluntary codes ofconduct.114 Underlying all ofthese concerns
was a continued recognition of the unprecedented power of corporations to
shape economic and social outcomes."'s These concerns ultimately resulted
in the drafting of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights
in 2003 (Norms)."' At least seventy non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
112 See generally Econ. and Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Comm'n on Transnat'1 Corps., Rep. of
the Secretariat on the Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnat'l Corps., 23
I.L.M. 602, 626-40 (1984).
113 Human Rights Principles and Responsibilities for Transnat'l Corps. and Other Bus. En-
ters., Introduction, 4, U.N. Doc.E/CN. 4 /Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.I/Add.i (Feb. 2002).
114 For a discussion on early voluntary codes of conduct, see Hans. W. Baade, The Legal Effects
ofCodes ofConductfor MultinationalEnterprises, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3,4 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
115 See Larry Cati Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations'
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility in International Law, 37 COLUm. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 287, 293 (2oo6); Troy Rule, Using
"Worms" to Change International Law: UNIHuman Rights Sneaking in Through the Back Door?, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (2004).
16 Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law, supra note ii, at 330; Larry Cat!
Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations' "Protect-Respect-Remedy" Project: The State, the Cor-
poration and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INTL. L. 37, 45-46
(201).
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endorsed the Norms, including Oxfam, Amnesty International, and Human
Rights Watch."'
Although widely endorsed by NGOs, the Norms encountered strong
resistance from the very entities to which they would be applied-the
multinational corporations tasked with respecting human rights."" The rules
had the potential to bind corporations to a set of mandatory obligations,"'
a state of affairs, which many corporate leaders found untenable. A number
of states also resisted the Norms, claiming that they threatened both state
sovereignty and the integrity of international law.120 The United Nations
Sub-Commission on Human Rights eventually declared that the Norms
had "no legal standing" and that the Human Rights Commission "should not
perform any monitoring function in this regard."121
Although the Norms failed to generate widespread support for a variety of
reasons, one important factor was that corporations perceived an unworkable
amount of ambiguity in the human rights obligations that the Norms
proposed."' Structurally, the Norms did not sufficiently differentiate between
the responsibilities of states and corporations.123 Furthermore, the Norms
identified ideals of conduct rather than minimum standards. For example,
Article 12 of the Norms required that corporations contribute to the realization
of "the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health."124 This
exhortation was not only difficult to clearly define, but implied a corporate
obligation to satisfy a wide range of social obligations that governments in
117 See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 As. J. INTL L. 9o, 906
(2003).
n8 See e.g., Timothy E. Deal, Senior Vice President, U.S. Council for International Business,
Address at the Frank Hawkins Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Seminar: Are Human Rights
the Business of Business? (Dec. so, 2oo3) (transcript available at http://www.uscib.org/index.
asp?documentlD=2794); Adam Greene, UN Steps Back From "Norms"on Business andHuman Rights,
USCIB (July z3, 2004), availahle at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?DocumentlD=2936 ("Business
believe[d] the proposed UN norms would shoulder companies with the primary responsibility for
upholding human rights.").
11g See Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note n7, at 913 (noting that "[t]he Norms as adopted are
not a voluntary initiative of corporate social responsibility," but also stating that "[although not
voluntary, the Norms are not a treaty, either.").
120 Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations' "Protect-Respect-Remedy" Project: The State,
the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, supra note u16, at 45-46.
121 U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. to the Economic and Social Council, 6oth Sess., I
2004/u16(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/soo4 /L.nu/Add. 7 (Apr. 22, 2004).
122 See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Rep. of the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights and Responsibilities ofTransnat'1
Corps. and Related Bus. with Regards to Human Rights, 61st Sess., 20(d)-(e), (h), U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2oo5 /9s (Feb.5, 12005).
123 Id.
124 U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities ofTransnat'l Corps. and Other Bus. Enters. with Regard to
Human Rights, 55th Sess., 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200 3/I2/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
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the developed world have difficulty in delivering. Other obligations, such
as the promotion of "mental health" and "education," were never sufficiently
articulated. 'The Norms also incorporated vague obligations such as the
adherence of standards of "bioethics" and "the precautionary principle."'25 The
Norms were thus filled with "a complex, vague, and non-bounded set of norms"
that would be extremely difficult to define, let alone satisfy, by multinational
corporations expected to follow them. 2 6 It was upon this uncertain footing,
in the wake of an unsuccessful regulatory effort that provoked the ire of many
in both business and government, that a new framework was to be built for
articulating the obligations of businesses toward human rights.
In 2005, then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed John Ruggie as
the SRSG in order to identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility
and elaborate on the state's role in the development oftransnational regulation .127
In his initial report in 2006, the SRSG boldly dismissed the Norms. He viewed
them as an exercise "engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses . . . [resulting in]
the highly contentious though largely symbolic proposal to monitor firms
and provide reparation payments to victims."128 Th Norms were based upon
"exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities [which] created confusion
and doubt even among many mainstream international lawyers and other
impartial observers."129 As a result, the Norms suffered from a lack of precision
in delineating state and corporate responsibilities and "obscure[d] rather than
illuminate[d] promising areas of consensus and cooperation among business,
civil society, governments and international institutions with respect to human
rights."2 0 'Ihe SRSG then conducted fourteen multi-stakeholder consultations
on five continents, sanctioned more than two-dozen separate research projects,
and received twenty submissions and one thousand pages of documents. 3' The
subsequent reports were the result of these preliminary efforts.
125 Id. 13-
126 Denis Arnold, Transnational Corporations and the Duty to Respect Basic Human Rights,
Business Ethics Quarterly, 2o Bus. ETHICS Q371, 375 (2010).
127 See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, 61st Sess., 9 i(a)-(b),U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/2oo 5/L.87 (Apr. 15, 2005). See also Office
of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm'n Res. 2oo5/69,% U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/RES/2oo5/69 (Apr. 20, 2005) (stating that in 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights
adopted resolution E/CN.4/RES/2oo5/69 requesting the "Secretary-General to appoint a special
representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises").
128 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary--General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises, 59 , U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/2oo6/ 9 7 (Feb. 22, 2oo6) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
SRSG Rep. 2oo6].
129 Id.
130 Id. 69.
131 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report ofthe Special Representative ofthe
UN Secretary-General on the Issue ofHuman Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Busi-
ness Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Frameworkfor Business and Human Rights, delivered
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In April of 2008, the SRSG published a report entitled "Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights."'32 This report
concluded that the global marketplace as currently structured posed significant
risks to society due to the enormous disparity between the marketplace's power
and the reach of the institutions responsible for its regulation.133 The SRSG
characterized this disparity between global economic forces and the capacity of
societal institutions to manage such forces through their national governments
as "governance gaps."134 These gaps were responsible for an increasing number
of corporate-related human rights abuses.' The inability of many national
governments, even those of the largest and most economically dominant states,
to manage social impacts associated with globalization left the business and
human rights discussion, in the words of the SRSG, without "an authoritative
focal point."13 6
These governance gaps could be addressed through a framework comprising
of three core pillars, specifically, "the State duty to protect against human rights
abuses by third parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies."' The pillars
were intended to form "a complementary whole in that each supports the others
in achieving sustainable progress" on the issue of human rights and business.' 3
The responsibility to respect human rights was "the baseline expectation for
all companies in all situations.""' Such responsibility could be discharged if
corporate decision-making bodies engaged in due diligence "to become aware
of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts."14 As a result, the SRSG
concluded that the regulatory framework governing transnational corporations
continued to operate in much the same manner as it did at an earlier time.141
The 2011 final report of the SRSG is titled "Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and
Remedy' framework."' 42 The SRSG's report is, in fact, comprised of guiding
principles.143 Their purpose is to establish "a common global platform for action,
to the Human Rights Council, 4 , U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/ 5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) [herein-
after SRSG Rep. 2008].
132 Id.
133 Id. f 4. See Jean-Philippe Rob6, Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution ofa Pluralistic
Legal Order, in GLOBAL LAw WITHOUT A STATE 45,52-56 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
134 SRSG Rep. 2008, supra note 131, 3 (discussing the concept of "governance gaps").
135 Id 3.
136 Id. 15-
137 Id 9.
138 Id
139 Id 24.
140 Id 56.
141 Id 13.
142 SRSG Final Rep. 201z, supra note 13.
143 Id
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on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing
any other promising longer-term developments."1" They are not intended
to be new legal obligations, but rather to elaborate upon the implications
of already existing standards and practices for states and businesses.145 The
principles unify these standards and practices under a single framework to be
utilized by corporations and states. They do not compel mandatory conduct or
reporting requirements backed by punitive measures. They also lack the threat
of developing compulsive power, unlike the Norms, which envisioned measures
that were not voluntary.
This does not mean, however, that the principles outlined in the 2011
report are merely ambiguous exhortations to good conduct, uniformly accepted
but readily ignored. Rather, Ruggie describes his approach as "principled
pragmatism: 'an unffinching commitment to the principle of strengthening the
promotion and protection of human rights as it relates to business, coupled
with a pragmatic attachment to what works best in creating change where it
matters most-in the daily lives of people."""'The principles articulate specific
calls to action by multinational corporations. They present specific obligations,
processes, and implementations that firms are expected to pursue in respecting
human rights. Finally, they successfully combine the aspirational character of
global documents and the realistic sensibility of a business plan. Principled
pragmatism is indeed an apt term for Ruggie's approach.
B. The Ruggie Framework and Due Diligence
The pragmatic implementation of these principles is likely the component
of the Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework that is of greatest interest to
multinational corporations, and thus is our primary focus here. The cornerstone
of this pragmatism is the corporation's obligation to act with due diligence to
avoid infringing on the human rights of others. The notion of due diligence in
international law and human rights is nothing new. The history of due diligence
as a standard in international law can be traced back to Grotius and other
seventeenth century writers who reference the concept.147 Today, due diligence
144 Id. 13.
145 Id. 14.
146 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of
the Sec'y Gen. on the Issue ofHuman Rights and the Transnat'l Corp.s and Other Business Enterprises -
Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization ofthe 'Protect, Respect and
Remedy' Framework, 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/i4/2 7 (Apr. 9, soio) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
SRSG Rep. 2010] (citing SRSG Rep. 2oo6, supra note 128, 1 Si).
147 SeeJoanna Bourke-Martignoni, The History and Development ofthe Due Diligence Standard
in International Law and its Role in the Protection of Women Against Violence, in DUE DILIGENCE
AND ITs APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 47,48 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed.,
2008) ("The writings of seventeenth-century jurists including Hugo Grotius, Richard Zouche, and
Samuel Pufendorf made mention of the responsibility of the sovereign to prevent injuries to foreign
nationals, to punish private persons who commit acts of violence against foreigners and to ensure
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in human rights has been applied in a variety of situations, such as gender-based
discrimination and violence, human trafficking, and freedom from torture.148
An advantage of using the due diligence concept is that it is a well-trodden
doctrine in business and therefore readily recognizable by corporate interests.
In corporate law, for example, the duties of ordinary care and good faith owed
by directors include oversight obligations, which in turn require the collection
and evaluation of information, "reasonable decision-making procedures,
monitoring, reporting, and adjustments of corporate policy when and where
necessary."149 Due diligence in the securities industry involves investigation
and independent verification by underwriters in order to prepare registration
statements.s 0 Materially foreseeable risks must be discovered and disclosed by
publicly traded corporations in public filings and offering documents, and thus
require adequate investigatory procedures to meet the due diligence standard."'
A further source of understanding is the compliance and ethics program set
forth in the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which require the exercise of
"due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct.""' These due diligence
requirements in business can provide a shield in some cases from liability if the
required steps were properly performed.'
Therefore, the SRSG made a wise choice when including due diligence as
a key concept in defining corporate human rights obligations. In 2008, the
SRSG's report concluded that corporations could satisfy procedural aspects of
due diligence by analyzing the country context in which their activities occurred
and determining their human rights impacts and whether such activities
might contribute to abuses.15 4 Substantive guidance could be derived from the
International Bill of Rights as well as the core conventions of the International
Labor Organization.15  The report required proactive due diligence by
reparations are made.").
148 See, e.g., Viviana Waisman, Human Trafficking: State Obligations to Protect Victims' Rights,
7he Current Framework and a New Due Diligence Standard, 33 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
385,405-07 (2010).
149 See Lucien J. Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant o theAlien
Tort Statute, 22 EMORY INTL L. REV. 455,471 (2008).
o50 See Joseph K. Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-Envisioning Underwriters' Con-
tinuous Due DiligenceAfter Worldcom, 30 CARDOZo L. REV. 2001, 2013-14 (2009) (stating that in the
securities industry "due diligence is an extensive investigation of the issuer" including "a thorough
time-consuming review of the issuer's industry, its reputation and the reputation of its principal
officers").
151 See Dhooge, supra note 149, at 471.
152 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8B2.I(a)(I) (2011), available at www.ussc.gov/
Guidelines/2on_Guidelines/ManuaLHTML/8b2.i.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 204).
153 See Christian A. Young, Note, Looking Back on WorldCom: Addressing Underwriters' Due
Diligence in Shelf Registration Offerings and the Needfor Reform, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 521, 528-29
(2007) (explaining the "due diligence defense").
154 See SRSG Rep. 2008, supra note 131, 25-
155 Id 58.
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corporations in three specific areas. First, corporations must examine the context
within which their activities take place in order to "highlight any specific human
rights challenges they may pose."1s6 Second, due diligence required assessment
of the potential and actual human rights impacts of a proposed business activity
given the context in which it occurs and the corporation's status as a producer,
manufacturer, service provider, supplier, or employer.'s Finally, due diligence
required corporations to determine whether their relationships within a specific
activity contribute to human rights abuses. 5
Published in March 2011, the SRSG's fifth and final report (the 2011
report) has significant content relevant to due diligence.' The 2011 report
further divided the due diligence process into four distinct components.
Initially, corporations should "identify and assess any actual or potential
adverse human rights impacts" caused by or deriving from their activities or
relationships through utilization of internal and external human rights experts
and "meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other
relevant stakeholders."'6 0 ihe second element of an adequate due diligence
process is "effective integration" and "appropriate action."' 6 ' 'The third element
of an effective due diligence program is tracking. In order to determine the
effectiveness of responses to potential impacts, corporations are encouraged
to track their effectiveness through utilization of "appropriate qualitative and
quantitative indicators" and solicit feedback from internal and external sources,
including affected stakeholders.162 The final element of an effective due diligence
program is communication of human rights policies and practices to affected
stakeholders. 63
For multinational corporations, this is where the rubber hits the proverbial
road. The due diligence processes in the framework represent a method to help
firms manage their responsibilities to impacted communities as well as their
responsibilities to shareholders. As Ruggie states, conducting due diligence
"protect[s] both values and value.""
156 Id. 57.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 SRSG Final Rep. 2011, supra note 13, at Annex It iy--u.
16o Id. Annex 8.
161 Id. Annexi 19.
162 Id. Annex zo.
163 Id. Annex 21.
164 SRSG Rep. zoro, supra note 146, 1 79.
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III. THE CHALLENGE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE PROTECT, RESPECT,
AND REMEDY FRAMEWORK
As noted earlier, the SRSG has expressed four core elements ofhuman rights
due diligence under the Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework. First, firms
should have an explicit and transparent human rights policy.6 s Second, there
should be an assessment of human rights impacts on firm activities.'"6'Ihird,
the values underlying human rights should be disseminated and embedded
throughout the organization's culture and systems.167 Fourth, performance
should be tracked and reported.' 6
The SRSG has stated that an ongoing process of due diligence is required
for successful integration and implementation of human rights into corporate
practice.' 9 Due diligence expects that firms will make themselves aware of
potential human rights issues, prevent these problems from happening, and
mitigate adverse impacts that have already arisen.'7 o 'This Part evaluates the
four core elements of due diligence and offers recommendations to clarify
and improve their effectiveness. While each discussion represents a material
advancement in the framework, further understanding of these obligations can
do much to increase compliance and strengthen future relationships between
corporations and the human rights community.'
A. Reinforce the Business Benefits ofHaving a Broad Human Rights Policy
One of the core business goals of the framework is the development of a
firm-wide human rights policy.'72 The SRSG's 2008 report briefly describes
the scope of this policy as one that may use "broad aspirational language" to
describe human rights, but should also offer "more detailed guidance" in areas
where it is necessary to give commitments specific meaning."' The SRSG's
2011 report elaborates upon the specific requirements of this policy, including
approval by senior level management; formulation in consultation with internal
165 See also SRSG Rep. 2008, supra note 131, 6o (discussing the scope of due diligence).
166 Id. 6,.
167 Id 62.
168 See also SRSG Final Rep. 2011, supra note 13, Annex 16-17 (indicating the operational
principles used in tracking and reporting); Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Pro-
motion ofAll Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and CulturalRights, Including the Right
to Development, 49, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/in/i3 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John
Ruggie) [hereinafter SRSG Rep. 2009].
169 SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168.
170 See SRSG Rep. 2oo8, supra note 131, 56.
171 Id 64 (explaining that as companies adopt and incorporate due diligence practices into
their industries, they play a role in improving human rights impacts in their corporate community
and developing countries).
172 SRSG Final Rep. ioz, supra note x3, It 15-16; SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 16 8, 49.
173 SRSG Rep. zoo8, supra note 131, 6o.
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and external experts; broad coverage to include personnel, business partners,
and other parties with direct links to the corporation's operations; public
availability; and reflection on operational policies and procedures.17 4
Having a human rights policy is certainly an important first step in
furthering the goals of human rights protection in a corporate enterprise. An
overarching policy is necessary to give the firm some direction in terms of its
goals, operationalization of those goals, expression of values, and responsibilities
of key internal stakeholders of the organization. In addition, the SRSG rightly
notes that there is a tension between having a freestanding human rights policy
and one that is integrated within established due diligence processes.7 s The
former risks not being integrated into the firm's operations, while the latter
practice might dilute the unique attributes of human rights protection. The
underlying thrust of this concern is expressed in the SRSG's 2010 report, which
wisely instructs that human rights initiatives need to be addressed directly and
in a systematic fashion."' A policy is the first expression of that initiative.
Future work by the SRSG's successors must account for the fact that,
while such policies are important, standing alone they are no panacea for
eliminating socially irresponsible behavior. Studies into corporate ethical codes,
by analogy, report that the benefits from such expressions of values are far from
uniform."' While some studies associate ethical codes with reduced unethical
conduct,"' others report no such benefit.'7 1 Indeed, a 2001 meta-analysis of the
effectiveness of such codes found that only eight of nineteen studies showed a
significant relationship between the existence of a corporate code and ethical
behavior.'s
Regrettably, the SRSG's reports did not discuss the embedded values of
expressions of corporate human rights policy. These embedded values must not
remain deemphasized in future implementation of the framework. One such
value is the positive impact that communicated human rights policies may have
upon shareholder confidence. Significant individual and institutional investors
may be motivated to invest or increase their stake in firms with a human rights
174 SRSG Final Rep. 2nU, supra note 13, Annex 16(a)-(e).
175 See id. Annex '7.
176 See SRSG Rep. 20o, supra note 146, 9 56.
177 See, e.g., Patrick M. Erwin, Corporate Codes ofConduct: The Efects ofCode Content and Qual-
ity on Ethical Performance, 9 9 J. Bus. ETHICs 535, 535 (2on).
178 Donald L. McCabe, et al., The Influence of Collegiate and Corporate Codes of Conduct on Eth-
ics-Related Behavior in the Workplace, 6 Bus. ETHICS Q.461, 471 (1996); see also Mark John Somers,
Ethical Codes of Conduct and Organizational Context: A Study of the Relationship Between Codes of
Conduct, Employee Behavior and Organizational Values, 30 J. Bus. ETHICS QI8S, 185 (2001).
179 Lawrence B. Chonko & Shelby D. Hunt, Ethics and Marketing Management:An Empirical
Examination,13 J. Bus. RES. 339,356 (1985); see also Margaret Anne Cleek & Sherry Lynn Leonard,
Can Corporate Codes ofEthics Influence Behavior?, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 619, 625 (1998).
18o Mark S. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship between Corporate Codes of Ethics and
Behaviour, 3 2 J. Bus. ETHICS 247, 249 (2001).
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policy.' Such policies are one indicator of management quality because they
demonstrate risk awareness and mitigation and may prove crucial in meeting
investor expectations by ensuring corporate access to business opportunities that
require robust statements of human rights values. Examples in this regard may
be found in financial organizations such as the World Bank, the International
Finance Corporation, and regional institutions, all of which include statements
of human rights values in their governance requirements.'
Perhaps more importantly, investors may be dissuaded from divesting as
a result of such policies. Although divestment by individual investors may
have no appreciable effect, such action by institutional investors could have
a significant impact on many corporations.' An example in this regard is
the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest
public pension fund in the United States, with assets in excess of $200
billion.'84 Although characterizing divestment as an ineffective strategy for
achieving social and political goals and expressing a preference for constructive
engagement, CalPERS' 2009 Statement of Investment Policy nevertheless
permits divestment where the continuation of the investment is imprudent
and inconsistent with fiduciary duties.' A comprehensive and implemented
human rights policy could dissuade institutional investors like CalPERS from
divestment in certain situations.
Corporate human rights policies will also motivate socially responsible
investors to act. Socially responsible investing is a two trillion dollar industry.1 6
Indeed, over half of Americans surveyed monitor a firm's social performance,
ethics, and environmental behavior.' A corporation's robust statement of
its human rights policy can send strong signals to various constituents that
the organization is a worthy recipient of socially responsible investing. The
181 See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,
ioi Am.J. INTL L. 819, 8zo (2007).
182 See Corporate Governance Development Framework, DFI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POR-
TAL, available at http://www.cgdevelopmentframework.com (follow the hyperlink then click on the
"CG Dev. Framework" tab) (last visited Jan. 19, 2014); see also The Newly Revised IFC Performance
Standards - Guidance on Implementation by EPAssociation Members from iJanuary 2012, EQUATOR
PRINCIPLES (Dec. 7, 20n1), available at http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/all-ep-as-
sociation-news/254-revised-ps.
183 See, e.g., Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort
Statute, supra note 149, 495 & n.243, 496 (discussing the Sudan Divestment Task Force).
184 See generally Facts at a Glance: General, CALPERS I (June 2012), available at http://www.
calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/general.pdf.
185 See Statement of Investment Policy: Regarding Divestment, CALPERS $T I, 4(a) (Feb. 17,
2009), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/policies/invo-risk-mang/di-
vestment.pdf.
186 Steve Schueth, Socially Responsible Investing in the United States, 4 3 J. Bus. ETHICs 189, 191
(2003) ("[N]early $2.2 trillion under professional management in the United States involved in one
or more of the three primary social investment strategies.").
187 Consumers Want Brands-and Social Responsibility, 152 SALES & MARKETING MGMT.,
Jan. 2000, at 76.
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investment decisions of hundreds of socially responsible investment mutual
funds may be influenced by the expression of a human rights policy.' 8
Human rights values and practices can also be expressed as core components
of a firm's social marketing campaign to ethically sensitive consumers and
organizations. As standards for social and environmental corporate reporting
coalesce,"' a firm has the opportunity to showcase its human rights performance
through explicit rankings and measures that demonstrate the firm's absolute
performance and performance relative to competitors.190 Furthermore,
such policies enhance and safeguard corporate reputation and brand image.
Reputation and image are crucial to attract a wide range of stakeholders,
including consumers, employees, shareholders, suppliers, and business partners.
To the extent that human rights violations, or the perception thereof, cause
harm to a firm's reputation and image, all of these relationships are negatively
impacted.'Ihe damage caused to reputation and current and future profitability
as a result of this negative impact is often inestimable.' Human rights
controversies can besmirch corporate reputations overnight, and the resultant
damage can linger in the public's conscience for decades.'92 Rehabilitation
of reputation and regaining public trust are expensive, time consuming, and
difficult propositions. Well known global corporations such as Nestl6, Union
Carbide, Exxon, and possibly BP may "remain inextricably linked to their
misdeeds despite the passage of time."'93
Enhancing trust and confidence among stakeholders is particularly crucial.
Distrust and low confidence do not provide transnational corporations with
significant margins for error with respect to human rights issues. Local
stakeholders are much more likely to grant the benefit of the doubt and allow
for remedial actions for human rights violations committed by firms with high
levels of community trust. Allegations of corporate misdeeds may be addressed
and remedied at their root by corporate human rights policies, rather than
188 See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes ofEthics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Marketfor
Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 289 (2005).
189 See Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving InternationalAgenda, supra note 181.
190 See Cynthia A. Williams &John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Con-
sider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 81 (2005) (noting that most global 500 companies "now
have corporate social responsibility (CSR) officers and departments and ... as a response to chang-
ing market conditions, well-run companies are paying sharply increased attention to human rights
and other social and environmental risks throughout their global value chain.").
191 See, e.g., Sharon Beder, Put the Boot In, ECOLOGIST, Apr. 2002, at 24 (discussing the impact
on Nike's brand after a decade of highly publicized allegations of human rights abuses.).
192 See Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility:A Multifaceted Tool to AvoidAlien
Tort Claims Act Litigation While Simultaneously Building a Better Business Reputation, 40 CAL. W.
INT'L L. 55, 85 (2009); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France's
Nouvells Rigulations Economiques, 21 AzZ. J. INT' & Comp. L. 441, 460 (2004) (citing CHRISTO-
PHER L. AVERY, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FIVE COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS (1997), avail-
able at http://198.17 0.85.29/Misconceptions.htm.
193 Dhooge, Beyond Volunteerism, supra note 192, at 460.
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taking on a new life in the media, on the Internet, and through NGOs.194
While transnational corporations will never perhaps achieve the same level
of credibility and trust enjoyed by NGOs and individuals actively engaged at
the grassroots level, that is not the ultimate objective of such policies. Rather,
human rights policies present valuable opportunities to the extent they enhance
trust and confidence in the communities in which corporations do business.
On a more abstract level, human rights policies have value because they
strengthen corporate legitimacy. It has been correctly noted that "[c]orporate
privilege can only be legitimate if the corporation serves the community from
which the factors of production of its wealth are derived.""s Ihis license to
operate requires broadly defining the constituencies to which the corporation
has some degree of responsibility."9 6 Human rights policies address this concern
by acknowledging the duty to respect rights beyond traditional shareholder
concerns in favor of a much larger pool of stakeholders.'" A properly drafted
and carefully implemented policy draws attention to all stakeholders, thereby
increasing collaboration, further enhancing corporate legitimacy, and justifying
a firm's license to operate within the community.19 s
B. Clarify the Necessary Assessment Standard of
Human Rights Impacts on Company Activities
The framework also invites firms to "identify and assess any actual or
potential adverse human rights impacts"that might arise from direct activities or
as a result of relationships with other firms.' 99 To achieve this goal, firms should
rely on internal and/or independent human rights expertise and consultation
with relevant stakeholders.2 0 Such assessment is an important part of human
rights compliance.'Ihe 2008 SRSG report emphasizes proactivity and forward
thinking, noting that human rights problems arise for corporations because they
fail to assess the human rights implications of decisions before those decisions
194 See, e.g., Memorandum from Ira M. Millstein et al., Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, Cor-
porate Social Responsibility for Human Rights: Comments on the U.N. Special Representative's
Report Entitled "Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights"
5 (May 22, 2008), available at http://198.170.85.29/Weil-Gotshal-legal-commentary-on-Ruggie-
report-22-May-2oo8.pdf [hereinafter Weil Memorandum] (discussing the business benefits of
corporate policies that safeguard human rights).
195 Backer, Multinational Corporations, TransnationalLaw, supra note uz5, at 301.
196 Id. at 301-02, 339-40 (arguing that a corporation's service to the community may include
a "broadening of the constituencies to which [it] must be responsible.").
197 Id. at 339-40.
198 Id. at 340.
199 SRSG Final Rep. 2oz, supra note 13, Annex A8; see also SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168,
49, 61.
200 SRSG Final Rep. 201, supra note 13, Annex Is; see also SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note
168, 49, 61.
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are undertaken.201 These assessments can also be linked with other risk-based
assessments in the organization, such as those relating to the environmental
and social impact assessments. 20 2
The SRSG ably explored other approaches to human rights assessments,
and a growing body of research highlights their importance.203  he framework
is to be commended for defining the scope of the assessment, specifically,
country and local contexts within which the business activity is to take
place, the impact of the activity within these contexts, and whether and how
relationships the company maintains or is contemplating may contribute to
abuses. 20 These parameters dispel any notions that philanthropy, relief in
times of emergency, and other desirable good deeds are sufficient to overcome
human rights violations in a firm's operations.2 0s As previously noted, it also
dispels another widely-held belief that legal compliance is all that is required
to obtain and sustain business' social license to operate. 206 This is a particularly
difficult problem in states where national legal systems are weak or wholly
absent, because such systems either do not offer the same level of protection as
international human rights standards, or conflict with such standards.207
In defining the scope of the assessment, the SRSG notes that as international
human rights instruments were written by and for states, their meaning for and
application to business has not always been well understood.208 While fluent in
economics, transnational corporations do not generally "speak the language of
human rights."20 9 As a result, there is "little that count[s] as shared knowledge
across different stakeholder groups in the business and human rights domain."210
Given this disconnect, the SRSG correctly attempts to translate the language
of human rights into the language of business using traditional concepts of
corporate governance. The SRSG accomplishes this by drawing parallels
between human rights impact assessments and impact assessments performed
by corporations on a routine basis. This includes financial, environmental, and
social impact assessments, and a "do no harm"standard familiar to businesses in
201 SRSG Rep. 2008, supra note 131, 1 61.
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., Tarek E Maassarani et al., Extracting Corporate Responsibility: Towards a Human
Rights ImpactAssessment, 4o CORNELL INTL LJ. 135,149,152 (2007) (noting the impact of a research
model created to explore corporate responsibility on human rights).
204 SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 1 50; see also SRSG Rep. 2oo8, supra note 131, 57
205 See SRSG Final Rep. zoi, supra note 13, Annex nt; see also SRSG Rep. zoio, supra note
146, 1 63-65; SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 68, 62; SRSG Rep. 2008, supra note 131, 55.
2o6 See SRSG Rep. 2010, supra note 146, 68; see also SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168,1 46,
66.
207 See SRSG Rep. 2010, supra note 146, 68; see also SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 1
46,66.
208 SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 57.
209 Backer, supra note 1S, at 307.
210 SRSG Final Rep. zon, supra note 13, 4.
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managing other types of risk.21' Corporate leadership clearly understands the
concept of due diligence in these contexts.212
'The SRSG's 2011 report goes further than any previous effort in defining
the elements of due diligence. 213 However, despite this admirable attempt, there
are several areas that require additional clarification. For example, there are
some inconsistencies in the characterization of human rights assessments in
the SRSG's reports over the last several years that merit attention. First, the
SRSG describes human rights assessment with the same language devoted to
risk assessment in other fields. Human rights impacts "merit a similar level of
due diligence as any other risk."214 Human rights assessment is described in
corporate governance parlance as assessment, management, and disclosure of
material risks in order to avoid liability.215 Other risks to be avoided include
delays in the planning, construction, and operation of foreign investment
projects, difficulties in labor markets, increased costs associated with financing,
insurance, and security, and reduced returns on investment.216 The end result of
failure to adequately safeguard against human rights violations is identical to
the failure to adequately conduct a risk assessment in other fields, specifically,
erosion of corporate value and the breach of disclosure requirements and
directors'fiduciary duties.2 17
Yet the SRSG sows seeds of confusion to the extent he backs away from this
comparison in other portions of his reports. Despite the previously referenced
characterizations, the SRSG has also described due diligence associated with
human rights assessment as being broader than traditional notions of due
diligence, specifically, "a comprehensive, proactive attempt to uncover . .. risks,
actual and potential, over the entire life cycle of a project or business activity... "218
In other words, this process must go beyond identification and management of
risks to the company and address risks to affected individuals and communities
211 See e.g., SRSG Rep. 2008, supra note 131, 24, 56; U.N. Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/2Sz oftS March 2006 Entitled
"Human Rights Council," $ 3, so, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 4 /74 (Feb. 5,2007) (by John Ruggie).
212 See also Williams & Conley, supra note 190, at 81 ("[A]s a response to changing market
conditions, well-run companies are paying sharply increased attention to human rights and other
social and environmental risks....").
213 See SRSG Final Rep. 2oz, supra note 13, Annex IT 17-21; Business and Human
Rights: Interview with John Ruggie, BUSINESS ETHICS, (Oct. 30, 201), http://business-ethics.
com/205x/io/30/8127-un-principles-on-business-and-human-rights-interview-with-john-rug-
gie/ (discussing implications of the corporate responsibility).
214 SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 51.
215 See id. 81. See also Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the
Alien Tort Statute, supra note 149, at 470 ("While directors and executives may know little about the
substance of human rights law, corporate leadership understands the concept of due diligence.").
216 See also SRSG Rep. 200, supra note 146, 70.
217 Id. 73.
218 SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 71.
631
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
associated with specific activities and relationships.219 This statement introduces
yet another difference between traditional risk management and human rights
assessment, that is, the involvement of rights holders.This involvement extends
human rights risk assessment beyond merely calculating probabilities. 2 0
While human rights are undoubtedly indivisible from all aspects of human
existence, including civil, cultural, economic, political, and social activities, the
SRSG's description of due diligence in this context backs away from prior
characterizations closely equating human rights due diligence to other readily
understandable and business-friendly risk assessment frameworks. What the
SRSG appears to offer transnational corporations in some sections of these
reports seemingly disappears in other sections.
Two other unresolved issues merit further attention in the future. First, the
preference for freestanding human rights assessment procedures, or the folding
of such assessments into existing due diligence processes, must be clarified?21
While the SRSG has accurately described the advantages and disadvantages
of each approach,222 the absence of a preference may leave some corporations
uncertain as to the procedures most suitable for conducting thorough
assessments set forth in the SRSG's reports.
Additional clarification is also necessary with respect to the consequences
of a due diligence process that fails to accurately assess human rights impacts.
Corporations that fail to conduct reasonable inquiries or disregard evidence
of actual or potential impacts clearly should not receive the protection of the
due diligence shield. But due diligence assessments may be thorough and
reasonable and nevertheless be tainted by erroneous predictions, a board's
well-reasoned decision not to follow every recommendation, or a company's
prioritization of human rights challenges and corresponding project policies
through its organization. The implications of such results must be addressed in
future efforts.
There are several key questions that must be addressed in this regard. One
example is whether boards of directors and other corporate decision makers must
either adhere to every recommendation and avoid every risk to human rights no
matter how remote, or retain a degree of independent business judgment. This
is an important question as the SRSG has stated that corporations are liable
for their own acts and omissions as well as those of companies with which they
maintain a "business relationship." 23 The breadth of this potential liability is
staggering because it includes acts and omissions by "business partners, entities
in the value chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its
business operations, products or services."22 4 It is questionable whether boards
219 See also SRSG Rep. 20o, supra note 146, S1.
220 Id. 85.
221 See also SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 1 77--78.
222 Id.
223 SRSG Final Rep. 20II, supra note 13, Annex 1 13.
224 Id.
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of directors and other corporate decision makers even possess sufficient data
to make informed decisions, let alone whether their imperfect decisions may
result in liability for the corporation. These decisions are also crucial because,
according to the SRSG, directors, officers, and employees may be subjected
to personal liability for adverse human rights impacts relating to the acts and
omissions of their corporations, at least with respect to "gross human rights
abuses," a term that remains undefined in the SRSG's reports.225 This may prove
to be a moving target as human rights laws evolves over time.226 Additionally,
the SRSG states that in situations where a corporation lacks "leverage" to
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts associated with its activities,
it should consider ending the relationship.227 What amount of "leverage"or lack
thereof that constitutes the tipping point remains unclear. Equally unclear is the
terminology regarding "ending the relationship." 228 In particular, questions may
be raised whether this statement places a requirement upon corporations or
merely a matter for consideration, and whether "ending the relationship"means
or requires divestment. If the relationship is deemed "crucial," the corporation
must consider the severity of the abuse and adopt measures designed to
mitigate adverse impacts. 29 But if the primary purpose of all corporations is to
maximize profits, are not all relationships crucial to maintaining and increasing
profitability? A corporation that fails to "end the relationship" under such
circumstances "should be prepared to accept any consequences-reputational,
financial or legal-of the continuing connection." 211 This statement echoes
standards for strict liability-a result that the SRSG could not possibly have
intended, yet arguably seems to fall within such language. At the very least, this
statement creates intended or unintended openings for future litigants seeking
to question board of director decisions impacting human rights considerations.
The SRSG has understandably instructed corporations that his reports, and
the due diligence framework set forth therein, are not intended to serve as a
"plug in tool kit."231 Nevertheless, to be truly effective, as undoubtedly intended
by the SRSG, the due diligence framework must serve as somewhat of a tool
kit and contain as much clarity and guidance as possible for the corporations to
be judged by its standards.
Finally, there is more that can be developed in the creation and use of impact
assessments. A human rights assessment practice generates value-capturing
opportunities for the organizations that implement them. Most obvious is that
such assessments help accurately predict the risks attendant to poor human
rights conditions such as kidnapping of employees, sabotage, government
225 Id. 23.
226 See id.
227 Id. 19.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id 1 IS.
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expropriation, and corruption. 23 2 Firms can also assess the potential benefits of
human rights practices such as increased local productivity, community support,
and consumer demand. 233
Future efforts should emphasize the positive spillover effect that human
rights assessments may have on the functioning of the organization as a whole.
The mere act of a company-wide assessment in a novel area such as human
rights can improve organizational learning in the practice of self-assessments
generally.234 Assessments can also generate unexpected efficiency opportunities.
For example, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the United
States, it required that each annual report include an assessment of internal
controls. 235 While most firms perceived SOX as another cost, a minority of firms
used this assessment requirement to eliminate redundant information systems,
streamline financial controls, and consolidate financial processes. 36 Future
efforts should illustrate that self-assessments are essential for implementing
corporate change, a source of potential value, and embed skills that promote a
more nimble organization.
Due diligence also improves risk assessment and management. Human
rights due diligence can be integrated into existing management systems to the
extent it resembles other forms of risk assessment.237 This integration broadens
and strengthens the information received by business, and consequently
improves the risk assessment that emerges from the data collection and analysis
processes.23 8 The added value associated with human rights due diligence and
enhanced risk assessment is also ofsignificant benefit to managers on the ground.
Furthermore, as risk assessment is well known to businesses, characterizing due
diligence in a similar manner "has the best chance to resonate with company
management and be absorbed into site specific practices." 239
In addition to these considerations, it should come as no surprise that
there is a link between respect for human rights and profitability.240 Respect
232 See also Maassarani et al., supra note 203, at 159-
233 Principle One of the United Nations Global Impact has also pointed to these outcomes
as beneficial. See Global Compact Principle One, UNITED NATIONs GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/principlei.html (last updated July 26, 2013).
234 See Mark B.Taylor et al., Due Diligencefor Human Rights:A Risk-BasedApproach 3, (Corp.
Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 5 3 , 2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.
edulm-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper-53_taylor etal.pdf.
235 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. io7-204, nz6 Stat. 745.
236 See also Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN., I, 29-30
(2008). See generally Stephen Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley,
HARV. Bus. REv., Apr. 2006, at 133, 133-34 (discussing how some firms welcomed Sarbanes Oxley
and made changes to their financial processes).
237 See Taylor et al., supra note 234, at 8.
238 Id. at 7-8.
239 Id. at 8.
240 See also Kimberly Gregalis Granatino, Corporate Responsibility Now: Profit at the Expense
ofHuman Rights with Exemption from Liability?, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L. REV. 191, 210-ii n.122
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for human rights promotes integrity in national fiscal and legal systems.24 1
This increased integrity in turn creates a secure investment environment by
discouraging arbitrary decisions, protecting intellectual property rights and
other business assets, and ensuring economic stability, thereby fostering an
atmosphere conducive to future growth. Characterizing respect for human
rights and due diligence in this manner serves to transform the topic from one
posing a potential threat to one of corporate opportunity.
The impact of such certainty cannot be overstated. Similarly, due diligence
provides greater certainty to transnational corporations themselves. The
occurrence of human rights violations and associated possibilities of litigation
and harm to corporate image are material risks for transnational corporations.2 42
These risks are exacerbated by the fact that human rights instruments are
fraught with uncertainty, and the power to define their meaning is fragmented
among numerous constituencies.243 Boards of directors may be unwilling to
undertake projects that present such risks, despite the fact that shareholders
would otherwise approve of risk-taking in the interest of maximizing profit.2"
Conservative decision making overly focused on risk avoidance and liability
concerns, rather than return on investment, is a disservice to shareholders
who are thus denied the full measure of return on their investment.245 Due
diligence alleviates this risk to the extent it provides greater certainty to boards
of directors that their decisions will be less likely to form the basis of litigation
and cause harm to corporate reputation.246 Boards of directors are thus freer
(1999); Anna Triponel, Business & Human Rights Law: Diverging Trends in the United States and
France, 23 Am. U. J. INT'L L. REv. 855, 886 (2008) ("[T]he argument by economic analysts that
adopting human rights standards is profitable for the corporation in the long run has gained cre-
dence.").
241 Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute,
supra note 149, at 459-
242 See, e.g., U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report ofthe Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General on the Issue ofHuman Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, 145, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/r 7/3/Add.2 (May 23, 2011) (byJohn Ruggie);
SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 81; Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability
Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, supra note 149, at 485.
243 See Williams & Conley, supra note 190, at iol.
244 See also William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care
with Delaware Public Policy:A Critique ofVan Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard ofReview Prob-
lem, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 449,455 (2002) (contending that "[a] standard of review that imposes liability
on a board of directors for making an'unreasonable'(as opposed to 'irrational') decision could result
in discouraging riskier yet socially desirable economic decisions."); Dhooge, Due Diligence as a De-
fense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, supra note i49, at 486.
245 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF COR-
PORATE LAW 93 (199r) (stating that "investors' wealth would be lower if managers' decisions were
routinely subjected to strict judicial review").
246 See Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort
Statute, supra note 149, at 486.
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to undertake projects with appropriate risks.2 47 Increased certainty and risk
minimization will also result in more efficient resource allocation.248
As noted by the SRSG, the primary means by which transnational
corporations address human rights abuses are through litigation and countering
negative publicity.249 These costs may be direct in the form oflegal representation,
responding to discovery requests and appearing at judicial proceedings or
indirect through the disruption of normal corporate functions, disclosure of
sensitive information, and reputational harm.25 0 Transnational corporations
may also incur transition costs associated with adaptation to constantly
changing human rights norms.251 Additionally, transnational corporations
would incur significantly smaller costs early in the foreign investment
decision-making process associated with issues concerning location, timing,
design, and personnel.252 The above-listed factors will result in a competitive
advantage for those firms that adopt a responsible approach to human rights.
Greater certainty strengthens national legal, fiscal, and political systems, which
in turn encourages foreign investment. This enhanced certainty encourages
responsible risk-taking, improves assessment of such risks, streamlines
management and resource allocation, and reduces negative costs associated
with litigation and crisis management." These benefits are in addition to those
arising from brand and reputational enhancement and building consumer
trust.25 4 Such firms are attractive to a wide range of stakeholders and customers,
including current and potential members of the supply chain, current and
future business partners, and present and potential employees.255
247 See also David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32. J. CORP.
L. 3 01,302 (2007).
248 See also Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort
Statute, supra note 149, at 487.
249 SRSG Rep. 2oo8, supra note 131, 93.
250 See also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEO-
RY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 166-67 (2oo6).
251 See also Andrew S. Gold, A Decision 7heory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflec-
tions on Disney, Good Faith and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 468 (2007); Well Memo-
randum, supra note 194, at 2.
252 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnat'l Corps. and Other Bus. Enters., Promotion and Protection ofAll Human Rights, Civil, Po-
litical, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Addendum, Summary
Reports ofFive Multi-Stakeholder Consultations, sz2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.i (Apr. 23, 2008).
253 See Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort
Statute, supra note 149, at 485-88.
254 See also Peter Frankental & Frances House, Human Rights: Is it Any of Your Business?,
AMNESTY INTL & INTL Bus. LEADERS F., Apr. 2000, at 25, available at http://198.I70.85.29/Ben-
efits-to-business-society.htm; Weil Memorandum, supra note 194, at 5-
255 Dhooge, Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute,
supra note i49, at 482.
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C. The Framework Should Better Clari5 How Firms
Should Integrate Human Rights Principles into the Organization
Another area where the framework and SRSG efforts remain insufficiently
clear is how corporations should satisfactorily integrate human rights policies
into their company structure.256 As the SRSG's findings reflect, a commitment
to human rights cannot simply exist in the exhortations of the responsible
sub-entity in the firm or a few commitment-minded employees .2 The concern
for human rights must be organization wide.
Yet before opportunities for firm benefits are discussed, the meaning of this
prong should be more precisely defined. The SRSG's reports are obviously only
the first step, and ideas will evolve over time. However, the precise definition of
this integration prong varies between documents. In 2009, the SRSG described
this element as "integrating those values and findings into corporate cultures
and management systems."251 In 2010, the four elements of due diligence
were described again, but this time the document explained this prong as
"integrating these commitments and assessments into internal control and
oversight systems. "259
This may be unintentional, but the difference in language could be
interpreted as meaningful. The language in the 2010 report has a focused
approach, encouraging firms to implement commitments and information into
formal control mechanisms and already existing management systems. 26 0 If
firm-expressed commitments to human rights and findings of assessment are
integrated into the key relevant processes of the organization, this appears to
satisfy the due diligence requirement of integration.
The 2009 SRSG report summarizes more detailed language from the 2008
report. However, the 2009 report speaks to a substantially different set of foci
and values.'65 The 2009 language is broader than the language used in 2008,
implying that integration of human rights sources from both formal findings as
well as informal values. The word'values'invokes a moral and ethical component
more strongly than its 2010 counterpart of 'commitments and assessments.' 62
The 2009 language also implies that due diligence implicates driving these
256 See SRSG Final Rep zon1, supra note r3, Annex 19.
257 See generally SRSG Rep. 2010, supra note 146, IN 89, 91 (noting that successful companies
have mechanisms in place to deal with such grievances, but they are vastly underdeveloped); SRSG
Rep. zoo8, supra note r3x, 6o (noting that companies need to adopt detailed guidance for human
rights policy in specific function areas).
258 SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 49 (citation omitted).
259 SRSG Rep. 2010, supra note 146, 83.
260 See id.
261 See SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 49 (citation omitted).
262 Compare SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 49 ("values"), with SRSG Rep. 2oo, supra
note 146, 83 ("commitments and assessments").
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values more deeply and broadly in the organization.2 63 This earlier report uses
the words'cultures and management'rather than the more technical and narrow
'commitments and assessments'.26 The 2009 language invokes ideals, while the
2010 language calls to mind processes and standardization. 265 The difference
may be subtle, but the choice of language does matter. This lack of precision
must be resolved going forward.
Operationalization of human rights principles through oversight systems
can generate value for firms. These benefits appear to be largely similar to
those expressed in the second prong on assessment. In a manner similar to
assessment, spillover effects from operationalization can offer expected and
unexpected learning opportunities and provide data that the firm may use to
further its operations.
The 2009 language, however, appears more far-reaching and thus holds
greater potential for participating firms. Corporate culture has emerged as a
clear source of risk in corporate activity. Human rights policies become vitally
important as nations begin to consider corporate culture when determining
corporate criminal accountability. Australian law, for example, focuses on firm
policies, rules, and practices to determine liability rather than the activities of
individual employees. 266
The focus by the SRSG appears to be that government authorities will
be the leading forces for inculcating a corporate culture respectful of human
rights.267 As the 2008 report states, "[g]overnments are uniquely placed to
foster corporate cultures in which respecting rights is an integral part of doing
business." 268 Such efforts involve requiring sustainability reports and redefining
fiduciary duties for organizations.The report focuses on state-owned enterprises
where shifts in corporate culture may be easier to achieve.269
The SRSG reports, however, do not place sufficient emphasis on the most
influential driver of changes in corporate culture-the companies themselves.
While government encouragement is important, a renewed focus should be
made to encourage private enterprises to change values through efforts of
their choosing. Corporations may respond well to reporting mechanisms or
changes in fiduciary reporting, and these practices certainly have their benefits.
263 SRSG Rep. 2oo9, supra note 168, 1 zo.
264 Compare id. 49 ("cultures and management"), with SRSG Rep. 2010, supra note 146,
83 ("commitments and assessments").
265 Compare SRSG Rep. 2oo9, supra note 168, 1 49-55, with SRSG Rep. 2010, supra note
146, 1 79-86.
266 See e.g., Kendra Magraw, Note, Universally Liable? Corporate Complicity Liability under
the Principle of UniversalJurisdiction, I8 MINN. J. INT'L L. 458, 486 (2009); 'CORPORATE CULTURE
AS A BASIS FOR THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, ALLENS ARTHUR RoBINsoN 15-i6
(2008), available at http://198.g 7o.85 .29/Alens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-
Ruggie-Feb-zoo8.pdf.
267 See SRSG Rep. zoo8, supra note 131, 1 29-32.
268 Id. 29.
269 Id. It 29-32.
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However, if the emphasis is on cultural change, for some firms the key drivers
for such change must come from inside the organization itself.
This means the emphasis of the SRSG and NGOs could be to interact with
corporate leaders or other influential members of the organization to encourage
them to embed human rights values into the organization as well as provide
tools to facilitate such cultural change. Significant literature already exists in
the management discipline on successful and empowering culture change.2 70
With such an emphasis on value change originating from top management,2 7 1
including the SRSG's own reports,2 72 leadership engagement and persuasion
might influence the most thorough culture change toward human rights
responsibility.
The embedding ofhuman rights values into the highest levels oforganizations
will have trickle down positive impacts on employees. 273 Such organizations
should experience improved recruitment, retention, and motivation. In addition
to the costs savings associated with such developments (such as those associated
with protracted recruitment, absenteeism, and interruptions in production), a
commitment to human rights practices through a robust due diligence process
is a source of motivation to workers. Such a process is a strong signal to not
only the marketplace and the current workforce, but also to the labor pool,
individual members of which may be motivated to actively seek out such firms
for employment.274 Current employees are motivated to remain and devote
maximum time and effort on behalf of an employer perceived to be a good
corporate citizen by implementing sound management principles, providing
guidance to employees working in difficult environments, and maintaining
high ethical standards. 275 Profitability and productivity increase as workers who
feel valued by their employer contribute to existing knowledge and skill bases
and work to achieve the company's objectives. 27 6 Perhaps most importantly,
270 See e.g., CHRISTOPHER S. DAWSON, LEADING CULTURE CHANGE: WHAT EVERY CEO
NEEDS TO KNOW (2010) (providing insights on CEO leadership); Jane Bryson, Dominant, Emer-
gent, and Residual Culture. 7he Dynamics of Organizational Change, 21 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
MGMT. 743, 743 (2008) (explaining the importance of organizational change within the organiza-
tional culture); Andrew Leigh, Sustaining Culture Change, 2I TRAINING & MGMT. DEV. METHODS
1o, 10 (2007) (expressing how to understand and work towards cultural change).
271 See EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 225-27 (3d ed.
2007).
272 See SRSG Rep. 2008, supra note 131, 62.
273 A Guide for Integrating Human Rights into Business Management, BUSINESS LEADERS
INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL IMPACT & OFFIcE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER 13, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideHRBusinessen.pdf (last
visited Jan. 19, 2014).
274 See Lucy Amis et al., Human RightsItIs Your Business, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEAD-
ERS FORUM 5 (2005), available at http://commdev.org/files/ii 5 4_fileHumanRightsIt IsYour_
Business.pdf.
275 Id
276 Id
639
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
such employees may serve as ambassadors for the business, thereby further
enhancing corporate reputation, attracting new customers, and recruiting
potential employees.277
D. Tracking and Reporting of Performance Metrics Need Better Standards
According to the framework, firms need to track the effectiveness of
their responses to human rights problems and report that performance. 211
These reports need to be based on "appropriate qualitative and quantitative
indicators."2" Like other parts of the framework, this call for tracking requires
clarification. One question that arises is what the preferred modes of tracking
and reporting really are. The framework identifies numerous characteristics of a
well-conceived human rights impact framework.280 Many widely respected and
influential frameworks share one or more of these characteristics. Examples
in this regard include the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights and the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights.281' Nevertheless,
the framework identifies several other assessment frameworks as equally
meritorious.
The identification of numerous alternatives, the shared characteristics
of these frameworks, and the absence of consensus, prevent mandated
compliance with any specific tracking and reporting model. This conclusion
merely recognizes the SRSG's own words that one size does not fit all and
that due diligence processes, including tracking and recording, will differ
by industry and operation. 2 2 Attempts to design and implement a specific
tracking and reporting model across industries may exclude worthy initiatives,
quash creativity in designing and implementing future guidelines, and reduce
incentives to innovate to meet the ongoing and dynamic challenges presented
by due diligence in the human rights context. Yet the SRSG is critical of the
multitude of human rights initiatives as lacking scale to truly move markets
and existing as separate fragments.283 In their place, the SRSG would provide
277 Id.
278 SRSG Final Rep. 201z, supra note 13, Annex 20; SRSG Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 1 49.
279 See SRSG Final Rep. 20u1, supra note 13, Annex 20.
280 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enters., Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 6o/2S.r
ofp15 March 2oo6 Entitled "Human Rights Councir, 1o-2, U.N. Doe. A/HRC/4/ 74 (Feb. 5,2007).
281 See e.g., Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLEs, http://
www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary-principles.english.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 204) (ex-
plaining the characteristics of the voluntary principles); Report3: Towards a 'Common Framework'
on Business and Human Rights: Identofing Components, Bus. LEADERS INITIATIVE ON Hum. RTs. 7,
http://www.realizingrights.org/pdflBLIHR3Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (identifying the
core concepts of business in human rights).
282 SRSG Final Rep. 2on, supra note 13, 1 I5; SRSG Rep. 20o0, supra note 146, 82; SRSG
Rep. 2009, supra note 168, 1 73.
283 SRSG Final Rep. 2011, supra note 13, 5.
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transnational corporations with "universally applicable guiding principles" for
meeting their due diligence obligations? The ability to accomplish this task
given the diversity of initiatives and the desirability of a universal framework
must be explored in future efforts.
One avenue that future efforts may explore is how to create baseline
standards that would level competition between transnational corporations
and across industries. This objective is accomplished, in part, through the
application of the SRSG's framework to all companies operating in the global
marketplace, regardless of how they are owned or their overall size and scale of
global operations. Such a requirement promotes equity between competitors
as well as between divergent industries. The SRSG conceded as much in his
2011 final report, in which he stated that his reports and the accompanying due
diligence requirement were applicable to "all business enterprises . . . regardless
of their size, sector, location, ownership and structure."28 5 However, the SRSG
seemingly backs off of this statement by noting that human rights obligations
are proportional to the size of the business.286 The questions of applicability and
proportionality thus remain unresolved.
The framework also promotes equity across international boundaries as
the responsibility to engage in due diligence and track and report the results
applies to all companies, regardless of where they are headquartered. This result
is particularly desirable for corporations based in states that impose reporting
and disclosure requirements beyond those established by other legal systems.
However, one potential source of confusion is the undefined requirement of
"formal reporting" where there is a risk of "severe human rights impacts."287
These requirements may speak the language ofthe human rights community but
may sow considerable confusion in the business community regarding which
impacts are severe enough to merit formal reporting and the intricacies of such
reporting, should it be required. A greater challenge for those who continue the
SRSG's efforts is to create baseline standards for all transnational corporations
to follow while simultaneously retaining flexibility in the due diligence protocol
by, for example allowing corporations and industries to select among a range of
due diligence options in determining which human rights risks are material to
their businesses.
284 SRSG Rep. 20zo, supra note 146, 81.
285 SRSG Final Rep. 2011, supra note 13, Annex.
286 Id. Annex 14.
287 Id. Annex 21.
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IV. FALSE REPORTING AND THE CONTINUING ROLE
OF PosT-ATS LEGAL LIABILITY
If firms engage in tracking and reporting of human rights compliance as
recommended by the SRSG, it is reasonable to believe that there could be a
positive economic impact. Investors and consumers will act on this information
and likely reward ethical, compliant companies. One would expect that
reported performance is of higher value (leading to greater economic reward)
than the mere existence of a code of conduct because it demonstrates action. An
example of the type of positive feedback that might be expected can be found
in corporate environmental, social responsibility, or sustainability reporting.288
Companies apparently believe that promotion of their social good makes a
difference to at least a segment of the buying and investing public. And there is
evidence that the words in and of themselves can have an impact.289
However, given the advantages of positive human rights reports, it is
possible that some companies may try to color the truth.'Ihey may exaggerate
performance, cover up failures, and generally mislead the public. In the context
of environmental impacts, the practice of making false or misleading claims
is known as "greenwashing."9 0 It has been suggested that analogous claims to
unrealized human rights compliance could be termed "bluewashing," to note
a firm's attempt to cloak itself in the flag of United Nations' principles.291 Left
unaddressed, the marketplace could become polluted with obfuscation and
half-truths, leaving consumers and investors with little ability to sort good
companies from bad. Unfortunately, direct legal recourse may be lacking. The
uncertain nature of corporate liability under the ATS means that the affected
must pursue some alternate legal option for enforcing compliance with human
rights norms.
There is at least one legal tack worth considering. The most viable route
may be indirect compulsion based on a corporation's voluntary statements. In
short, when a corporation's actions differ from its public promises about respect
for human rights there may be a cause of action based on the falsehood.292 A
number of specific laws at the state and national level could provide relief for
this general harm, depending on the context. But in general, it is true that
288 See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus
Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. Conr. L. x, 23-31 (200) (describing the
nature of corporate social responsibility reporting).
289 See, e.g., Pratima Bansal & lain Clelland, Talking Trash: Legitimacy, Impression Manage-
ment, and Unsystematic Risk in the Context ofthe NaturalEnvironment, 47 ACAD. MGMT.J. 93, 100-01
(2004) (finding that firms with low environmental legitimacy can decrease their unsystematic risk
by expressing a commitment to the environment).
290 William S. Laufer, SocialAccountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. Bus. ETHICS 253,
255-58 (2003) (describing the nature of greenwashing).
291 Halina Ward, The Interface Between Globalisation, Corporate Responsibility, and the Legal
Profession, I U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 813, 830 (2004) (referring to the use of the term "bluewash").
292 Ruggie, Business and Human Rights, supra note 181, at 835-
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liability for false statements depends on establishing factual elements that are
not necessary in an ATS claim, potentially limiting the usefulness. Even in the
most egregious cases, alternate liability may simply not exist. An examination
of the strengths and weaknesses of alternate liability is helpful in framing the
need for affirming corporate liability under the ATS.
A. Perverting the Framework with Deception
The possibility that firms will attempt to mislead the public with positive
statements related to human rights is an obvious obstacle to assessment of
corporate performance under the SRSG framework. Some such behavior may
be the result of a desire to deceive. However, the majority of false reports will
likely result from an attempt to dilute or obscure negative information with
a flood of positive. Regardless, the false information can detract significantly
from the goals of SRSG and other reporting systems. The incentives to comply
with human rights norms will be individually reduced. And more broadly, the
information environment in the marketplace will be such that good companies
cannot obtain an advantage from their behavior.
There have been many examples of broken information environments over
time, with strongly deleterious effects. For example, one can look to the time
of patent medicines to see a freewheeling world of mischaracterizations and
outright lies that favored products that simply did not work.2 93 More recently,
firms peddling financial products have come under fire for failing to disclose
all of the necessary information for consumers to make informed choices.294
In general, firms tend to take advantage of the flexibilities that exist in the
regulatory system. Ambiguity can easily give rise to information asymmetry.
With regard to social responsibility metrics, there is evidence that
corporations have engaged in providing misleading information, and that such
instances may be growing. David Hess reviewed research on increased corporate
"dissembling"-actual falsehoods or obfuscating bad information with
good-and stated that firms appear to engage in such acts in response to
legitimacy-threatening effects. 295 In this context, the deception is a deliberate
corporate strategy. In addition, evaluation of corporate social responsibility
performance is often unhelpful because it is based on reports created by the
293 JAMES HARVEY YOUNG,THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT
MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 44-57 (1962); Kara W Swanson, Food and
Drug Law as Intellectual Property Law: Historical Reflections, 2on Wis. L. REV. 33I, 341-42 (2011);
Balm ofAmerica. Patent Medicine Collection-History, SMITHSONIAN NATL MUSEUM OF AMER.
HisT., http://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/object-groups/balm-of-america-patent-medi-
cine-collection?ogmt-page=balm-of-america-history (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
294 Jean Eaglesham, Weighing the SEC'S Crackdown on Fraud, WALL ST.J., Apr. iI, 2o2, at C.I.
295 David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance Regula-
tion: Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 Bus. ETHICS Q447, 462-63 (2008); David Hess &
Thomas W. Dunfee, 7he Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate SocialReporting: Implementing a Standard of
Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, 17 Bus. ETHICS Q5, 6-8 (2007).
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firm itself, rather than actual evidence of firm behavior.296 Companies have
significant incentives to mislead without significant fear of being caught by
neutral auditors.
The appropriate remedy for deception depends on a number of factors, such
as the nature of the product and related harms, the enforcement environment,
and the sophistication of the public. Moreover, a remedy can be ex ante
regulatory-such as a regime of rules or certifications for statements, or ex
post tort-based-with an accounting for the specific harm. In the context of
human rights claims, the optimal system may not be fully clear until the future.
However, options exist now that allow the environment to develop.
B. An Initial Question of Corporate Speech
Before jumping into the liability question, it is important to appreciate
the strong protections corporations have for speech, particularly in the United
States. Such protection may conflict with an attempt to regulate a statement
that is arguably false or incomplete, but made in an attempt to engage in the
public forum. Additionally, if a company forcefully promotes good behavior
over failures, speech rights may tip the balance toward immunity.
In general, commercial speech has been viewed as subject to some regulation
and deserving of more limited protection than social or political speech.297
Prior to 1976, it was not even clear that the First Amendment protected
commercial speech at all.298 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2 99 the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized that
commercial speech regulation must be squared with the First Amendment,
though at a tier below non-commercial speech.3* Regulation of commercial
speech requires intermediate scrutiny and is most appropriate when false or
misleading information is involved.30'
However, not all corporate speech is commercial. Perhaps the most powerful
and impactful pronouncement to that effect is the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.3 02 In that case, the
Court determined that a particular ban on electioneering communication was
296 Hess, supra note 295, at 463.
297 Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, 7he Supreme Court as Prometheus: Breathing Life into
the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 Am. Bus. LJ. 507, 546-47 (2012) (detailing the U.S. Supreme Court's
development of the corporate speech doctrine).
298 See Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear:A Free Market Approach for Economic Expression,
17 COMM. L. & POL'Y 21,32-38 (2012) (discussing the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court's juris-
prudence regarding commercial speech).
299 Va. State Bd. of Pharmarcy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,762 (1976).
300 See Recent Case, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 8M8 (2013), 821--24 (2013) (discussing the law regarding
commercial speech in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205).
301 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,563 (1980) (noting the
importance of informational accuracy in commercial speech limitations).
302 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354-55 (2010).
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unconstitutional, and in doing so confirmed: "political speech does not lose
First Amendment protection 'simply because its source is a corporation.'" 0
Corporations enjoy the same speech protections as individuals when the
content is political or social.
The political/commercial divide is not necessarily easy to discern. A
firm's statement about human rights compliance could have elements of
social/political speech and commercial speech. Any distinction is likely to be
very context-dependent and arguable. One could suggest that "commercial"
should be the presumptive characteristic of corporate speech because firms
make such statements for a financial purpose.3 0 However, it may be that when
the speech is blended, firms may enjoy greater constitutional protection as a
result of the Court's broader protections: "It is possible that, post-Citizens
United, any corporate speech ... is an inextricably intertwined combination of
commercial and political speech and therefore cannot be regulated."3 0s Until the
case law clarifies a more dependable formula, some ambiguity on the level of
constitutional scrutiny will remain.
C Advertising Liability as a Means ofRedress
for Human Rights Violations
At base, liability for misleading the public is grounded in a statement. Given
the lack of required corporate social responsibility reporting, the statement
must usually be voluntarily offered.There is often a strategic advantage for firms
to claim adherence to human rights principles and social responsibility. In such
cases, the firm defines the ethical playing field, and arguably retains the option
of not playing at all. However, many firms do make substantial claims, such
as in the context of corporate sustainability reporting.0 6 Explicit, public firm
statements related to human rights may be contained in product labeling, an
advertisement, a web resource, or an annual report.
If the statements do not match reality, a variety of options exist to prevent a
company from retaining the unjust benefit of a compliance veneer. Perhaps the
most powerful is basic false advertising liability. In this context, a company that
disseminates untrue statements regarding its products and services is liable if
consumers are likely to be deceived and those consumers or competitors suffer
303 Id. at 342 (citing First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
304 David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social Reporting:
Implementing a Standard of Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, 17 Bus. ETHIcs Q 5, 14-16
(2007).
305 Sprague & Wells, supra note 297, at 55o.
306 REPORTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (GRI), 8 (2008), avail-
able at https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Reporting-On-Human-Rights.pdf. See
also Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers. A Case Study of Corporate Sustainability Report-
ing, 53 VA.J. INT'L L. 575, 590-92 (2013) (describing the rise of the GRI as the leading standard in
sustainability reporting).
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harm as a result. The FTC, in particular, has been an increasingly powerful
force for holding companies to their promises by using its powers under both
the deceptive practices and unfair competition prongs of the FTC Act. 07
Competitors also have the ability to take action against false or misleading
statements relating to a company's products, most prominently under the federal
Lanham Act.3 0s'Ihere are varying rights under state law as well. Reasonably, the
issue of truth in the promotion of a product or service might turn on statements
related to adherence to human rights norms. To the extent that consumers
place value in corporate promises to respect human rights-for example by
preferentially patronizing such companies-the law of unfair competition or
deceptive advertising may create liability.309
The first hurdle to this form of advertising liability is the fact that false
statements related to human rights are not always directed to consumers.
Because consumer reliance is a key factor, it is important that one be able to
prove not only a misleading statement, but also one that consumers would be
aware of when making a purchase or using a service.310 However, an actual
advertised statement is not always necessary to find liability. It has been
possible to predicate liability on a claim or promise that consumers only
impliedly were aware of and upon which they relied. The FTC is a leader in
this regard. The agency has consistently pursued companies for implying false
facts that are material to consumers, without evidence of a specific purchasing
connection. For example, in The Matter of CVS Caremark Corp., the FTC filed
a complaint against a pharmacy chain for improperly disposing of consumer
information.311 According to the FTC, CVS falsely "represented, expressly or
by implication, that it implemented reasonable and appropriate measures to
protect personal information against unauthorized access."312 The case settled
and CVS consented to extensive government monitoring.313 More recently, the
FTC filed a complaint against Internet giant Google for false statements about
307 Patricia E.M. Covington & Meghan S. Musselman, Recent Privacy and Data Security De-
velopments, 65 Bus. LAW. 611, 613 (2010).
308 IS U.S.C. § II25(a)(x)(b) (2012).
309 Su-Ping Lu, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights
Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 619-24 (2000).
310 11u Am. JUR. TRIALS 303 § I (2009) (describing the federal requirement for reliance); 5 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:57 (4 th ed.
2013) (explaining the extent of deception required under federal law); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary
Silverman, Common Sense Construction ofConsumer ProtectionActs, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. I, 18-19 (2ooS)
(illustrating that State law is a bit muddled on the need to demonstrate actual consumer reliance,
but acknowledging the apparent requirement of potential or capacity to mislead).
311 CVS Caremark Corp., F.T.C. No. 72-3119, 2009 WL 1892185, at *1-2 (June 18, 2009).
312 Id. at *2.
313 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, CVS Caremark Settles FTC Charges: Failed to Pro-
tect Med. and Fin. Privacy of Customers and Employees; CVS Pharmacy Also Pays s2.25 Mil-
lion to Settle Allegations of HIPAA Violations (Feb. 18, 2oo9), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2oo9/02/cvs.shtm.
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its privacy practices related to Google BuZZ.3 14 Again, the agency agreed to
settle in exchange for long-term monitoring and promises of additional privacy
protections.31s Notably, the FTC did not establish that consumers were aware of
particular practices or procedures, but rather relied on a general understanding
standard." 6 Moreover, it was irrelevant that the misrepresentations were not
obviously designed by the firms to influence purchasing decisions; the fact
that they were known and relied upon by consumers was enough. Subsequent
consumer outrage established that consumer reliance was real. Extending this
analysis, it seems that background knowledge of human rights claims should
be sufficient as well.
Another potential obstacle for advertising liability is that a statement on
human rights may not relate to the quality of a service or product, which is the
traditional grounding for this type of claim. But this is also not insurmountable.
Consumers routinely apply facts about production conditions and corporate
social responsibility in making purchasing decisions, unrelated to whether the
good or service functions as advertised. Designations like "dolphin-safe" tuna,
"cruelty-free" cosmetics, and "fair trade" coffee have an impact."' One of the
most famous cases involving such an alleged falsity occurred at the state level
in Nike v. Kasky."8 There, the plaintiff merely argued that defendant Nike made
false public statements about its child labor practices. Such statements were not
made in connection with an advertised product. The California Supreme Court
found the statements to constitute commercial speech, rendering it subject to
legal scrutiny."' Though California's false advertising statute was later limited
by amendment,320 it may be possible to field such claims in other states.
Importantly, the indirect nature of the harm involved can preclude liability
in certain false advertising contexts. A civil claim under state law often requires
that the plaintiff demonstrate some harm in addition to the deception.32' hat
can be difficult to prove when the human rights violation at issue takes place
far away, and the consumer is not monetarily impacted. While the Lanham
Act may be more relaxed in this regard, courts have restricted the use of the
statute to competitors.3 2  Such a case is not impossible to imagine, but the
314 Complaint at *2, *4-5, In re Google, Inc., No. 102-3136, 2on VVL 1321658 (ETC. Mar. 30,
2011).
315 Agreement Containing Consent Order, Google Inc., FTC. No. 1o2-336 (Oct. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o23i36/iio33ogooglebuzzagreeorder.pdf
316 In re Google, Inc., son 'WL 1321658, at *5).
317 Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The FirstAmendment, Fairness, and Corporate Reputa-
tion, 5o B.C. L. REV. 1457, 1462 (2009).
318 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002).
319 Id. at 259.
320 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ I7200-lo (Deering 2007).
321 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 310, at 21.
322 Delcianna J. Winders, Note, Combining Reflexive Law and False Advertising Law to Stan-
dardize "Cruelty-Free"Labeling of Cosmetics, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 454, 469-70 (2006).
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activist-company plaintiff would probably be significantly less common.
Against this backdrop, the FTC has an advantage: as its authorizing legislation
requires only likely deception, a mistaken purchasing decision may still fall
within the ambit of enforcement."'
Given the advantages of the FTC's enforcement powers, it is heartening
to see that liability for corporate social responsibility statements may have
particular resonance at the agency. As evidence, one may look to new regulation
on the advertising of "green" products. Often, companies will certify that
their products are energy efficient or manufactured using green processes and
source materials. This translates into increased sales, at least among a certain
segment of the population. However, some manufacturers have allegedly been
making empty claims.324 The FTC has promulgated guidelines for the use of
environmental marketing claims.325 Recently, the agency has indicated that
it will crack down on such false claims.3 26 The FTC has proposed updates to
its guidelines that would include false and misleading uses of certifications
implying green practices.327 It is not a great stretch to imagine the same
principles and regulatory possibilities being directed to corporate claims of
human rights compliance.
In addition to false advertising to consumers, it is possible to envision a
closely aligned action based on investor fraud. Section 10(b),328 and related Rule
10b-5,3 29 can create liability for losses stemming from a material misstatement
leading to a decision to purchase a security. It is reasonable that one could
consider a misstatement about human rights to be the central source of fraud.33 0
Courts have historically been a bit skeptical that such soft considerations are
the motivating factor in a securities purchase, but the increasing prevalence
of socially responsible investing makes such a case more viable now.33' In fact,
the recently enacted Dodd-Frank provisions require disclosures relating to
323 Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy- Defining Enforcement and En-
couraging the Adoption ofBest Practices, 48 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 809, 823-26 (2oI).
324 See Elizabeth K. Coppolecchia, Note, The Greenwashing Deluge: Who Will Rise Above the
Waters ofDeceptiveAdvertising?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. I353, 1353-54 (201o) (discussing the scope of
definitions of the term "greenwashing").
325 16 C.F.R. §§ 26o.1, 260.2(a) (2013).
326 Gabriel Nelson & Amanda Peterka, FTC Proposes Crackdown on "Greenwashing," N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/20lo/zolo6/o6greenwire-ftc-proposes-
crackdown-on-greenwashing-426o6.html.
327 Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63552 (proposed
Oct. I, zoo) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 260).
328 Securities Exchange Act of 934 § io(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
329 7 C.F.R. § 240.iob- 5 (a) (2013)-
330 See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Through a LegalLens, 81 TEMPLE L. REv. 831, 839-42 (2008).
331 See David J. Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of
Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compli-
ance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 336,379 (2011).
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payments to foreign governments, conflict materials and mining safety.332 The
more difficult factor, as with civil advertising fraud, may be demonstrating a
loss stemming from the deception. This is not out of the question, though,
as the increasingly connected world can spread word of a corporation's bad
behavior quickly and widely, creating negative publicity and a corresponding
stock decline.
In the current environment, advertisements, company statements in annual
reports, and declarations in other public documents create some likelihood of
consumer or investor reliance, and therefore liability. However, the variability
in such reporting makes the nature of any such statement less concrete and
weakens the consumer/investor connection."' Far more useful would be to
predicate liability on a specific and universal certification.33 4 This is where
the United Nations' Global Compact can play an important role. 3 s With its
ten principles in the areas of human rights, labor, and the environment," the
Compact provides a structure for statements of human rights compliance.
Companies voluntarily describe compliance in a periodic "communication on
progress" (COP).' Moreover, the failure to submit a timely COP can result in
a company being expelled, as over 4221 have been so far.' With a few changes,
the Global Compact could be used in concert with unfair competition law to
provide an enforcement mechanism.
Most importantly, it would need to be clear when a company has met a
certain level of compliance under the Global Compact. The new Global
Compliance Differentiation Programme is a step in this direction, permitting a
company to classify itself as "GC Advanced" only if it adopts and reports on a
332 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. NO. III-203, §§
1502-04, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-21 (2oo); Faith Stevelman, Global Finance, Multinationals and Human
Rights: With Commentary on Backer's Critique of the 2008 Report by John Ruggie, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT'L L. 101, 137-39 (2oz).
333 There is a variety of guidelines for corporate social responsibility, including the Interna-
tional Labour Organization's Tipartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises and Social Policy, the Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development Guide-
lines of Multinational Enterprises, and the International Standards Organization's ISO 26000.
Kathy Robb & Steven Schell, ISO'S Standards on Social Responsibility: ISO 26000 Takes Shape, 37
No. 4 ABA TRENDS I, 4 (2oo6).
334 See Miriam A. Cherry &Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility and Greenwashing after the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REv. 983, 1034-35 (20x) (analogiz-
ing a private certification model in CSR to that used in organic foods).
335 U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
336 7he Ten Principles, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGCflheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
337 U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT POLICY ON COMMUNICATING PROG-
RESS I (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/communicationon_
progress/COPPolicyFebiz.pdf
338 Id. at 3; Expelled Participants, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
COP/analyzingprogress/expelled-participants.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
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broad range of best practices."' A second important revision involves the use of
the Global Compact logo. Currently limited to use in connection with Global
Compact communications,3 4 if companies were instead permitted to use the
logo to claim compliance, the false advertising regime could reasonably apply.
A false certification of human rights compliance is likely to impact consumer
decision-making, and is really no different than misrepresenting environmental,
organic, or fair-trade production means.
D. Avoiding the Backlash ofReduced Information Production
in Response to Liability
Before fully embracing a voluntary disclosure-liability scheme for human
rights compliance, one must note the potential downside: companies may
simply decide to promise and disclose less. In fact, a rational firm may decide
that no disclosure is the best route.3 41 With less information to create a hook for
liability, the company is better insulated. Clearly, this would defeat the purpose
of imposing liability in the first place.
Notably, the balance between liability and disclosure is nothing new; it
has been a subject of concern in the product liability field for some time.342
When the potential for firm losses due to a liability rule become too great,
only consumer demand or regulation may tip the scales back. Such pressure
is common when the information relates to safety such as medical products.
Still, it is not unheard of in the context of broader social goals, as evidenced by
the FTC guidelines on green advertising. Indeed, regulation may be the most
powerful force in compelling full disclosure from companies.
Even without regulation, the ability of companies to choose silence over
a positive public position may be declining. Companies are facing increasing
pressure to engage in socially responsible business practices, and the refusal to
take a position could have a significant market impact. Conversely, when one
company makes a disclosure, competitors are pressured to provide information
or be perceived as hiding negative information. Hess and Dunfee describe this
phenomenon as the "unraveling process."343 They suggest that it is a form of
signaling that can have an effect even in the absence of regulation. However,
339 Differentiation Programme, U.N. GLOBAL COMPAcT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
COP/differentiation..programme.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
340 See Global Compact Logo, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
About'lheGC/GlobalCompact_Logo/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
341 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 295, at 23; see also Elizabeth Brown, No Good Deed Goes Un-
punished Is There a Need for a Safe HarborforAspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L.
& PoCy REV. 367,385-97 (2008) (describing various legal disincentives for adopting an aspirational
code of conduct).
342 See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency
Paradox, 82 IND. LJ. 623,643-49 (oo7) (explaining how requiring more information disclosure can
produce less information production when the latter is discretionary).
343 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 295, at 2o.
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they also identify barriers that exist to voluntary disclosure in the absence of a
consistent system of evaluation, such as the high cost of reporting and loss of
proprietary information."
Barriers aside, it is worth noting that the potential for decreased public
disclosure was raised after the Kasky decision. But all evidence is that companies
did not decrease disclosure or compliance efforts. Rather, they increased them
in view of the increased importance of good corporate citizenship.
CoNCLUsIoN
The ATS has been one of the most controversial human rights laws in
recent memory. Revived from two centuries of relative dormancy, the ATS
appeared to serve as an avenue for assessing liability against corporations who
violate human rights abroad. With the advent of more recent cases and the
imminent decision of Kiobel, the impact of the ATS appears to be in its decline.
New methods are needed to encourage compliance with human rights in global
commerce.
One such solution is the promising Protect, Respect, and Remedy
framework developed by SRSG John Ruggie. This framework, developed in
consultation with businesses, the legal profession, human rights groups, and
affected communities, represents the latest and most promising opportunity to
reduce corporate human rights violations. While offering much to commend,
the framework is in need of modest reforms that can amplify its effectiveness
and provide specific guidance to corporations tasked with complying with its
terms.
Finally, the emphasis on corporate voluntarism does not necessarily mean
that legal liability should be shelved as an option. There are few avenues for
such liability in the United States, but one potential option is making of
false statements about corporate practices. Consumers often rely upon such
statements, and the possibility exists for false advertising to become a source of
human rights exposure.
The need to protect human rights from corporate abuses remains as
important as ever in a globalized economy. As one opportunity for regulation
steadily narrows in the ATS, another opportunity for voluntary compliance
shows important promise. Regardless of method, placing human rights
obligations in a more prominent position on the corporate agenda represents
a worthwhile goal of both activist and scholarly pursuit. The reforms and
discussions here hopefully modestly advance that important agenda.
344 Id. at 23-24.
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